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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Summary 
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1.1. Background 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) play a significant role in the development of the 
world economy in general, and developing countries in particularly. Existing studies show that 
SMEs; create new jobs (Chandler, 2012; Hu & Schive, 1998; Neumark, Wall, & Zhang, 2011; 
Wit & Kok, 2014), contribute to poverty reduction (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2005), 
and improvement of technologies and innovations (Hemert, Nijkamp, & Masurel, 2013; Lee, 
Park, Yoon, & Park, 2010). In Vietnam, SMEs comprise 98% of existing enterprises, contribute 
40% to the GDP and 30% to the State budget, and generate half of all jobs (APEC, 2017). There 
are about 500,000 SMEs in Vietnam and number is projected to grow significantly according to 
reports from The General Statistics Office of Vietnam - GSO (2016). This is at the backdrop of 
a Government programme to enhance SME startups and growth since 2016, referred to as 
“entrepreneurial ecosystem” development by improving production technologies and their 
management. Against this background, it is important to analyze SME environment in Vietnam 
and the critical drivers of SME performance in particular. 
The evolution of SMEs in Vietnam dates back to the late 19th Century in the then Southern 
Vietnam which was a French colonial (1884-1945). SMEs’ growth was more pronounced 
between 1954-1975, but mainly in Southern Vietnam since private firms did not exist in the 
North where the economy was centrally planned. However, reunification of North and South 
Vietnam in 1975 led to adoption of the Northern system and immediate nationalization of all 
private enterprises. The situation lasted until the “Doi Moi” economic reforms of 1986 that 
formulated policies to nurture inception and growth of private firms and was further 
facilitated by the enactment of the first business law in 1990. However, the growth of SMEs 
was curtailed by the bureaucratic regulatory processes of registration thereby leading to 
changes in 1999 that improved the business environment by creating a single-point 
registration process which could be concluded in 15 days.  
Growth of SMEs in Vietnam has been remarkable since implementation of the 1999 reforms. 
According to GSO (2004), 121,000 SMEs had been established between year 2000-2004, 
with an upward trend observed over the years. Recent statistics by GSO (2016) show that the 
number increased from 300,000 in 2010 to 500,000 by 2016 and contributing 40% to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This has wider implications on economic growth, 
employment and poverty reduction in Vietnam (Harvie, 2004; Bruce, Deskins, Hill, & Rork, 
2009; Fatoki, 2014). The SMEs also promote development and generation of innovations (Li 
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and Daly, 2005). Hence, positive performance of such enterprises contribute significantly to 
long-term development of countries. 
There is a growing body of literature on performance of SMEs in developing countries, capture 
using different metrics. For example, in terms of; financial outcomes (Chadha & Sharma, 2016), 
sales growth or market growth (Swierczek & Ha, 2003), customer satisfaction (Hirons, Simon, 
& Simon, 1998; Williams & Naumann, 2011), employee growth, and return on assets (ROA) 
(Wolff & Pett, 2006), enterprise restructuring, the microeconomic reform, and the long-term 
macroeconomic development (Bevan, 1999; Hudson, Smart, & Bourne, 2001; Otter, Engler, & 
Theuvsen, 2014; Swierczek & Ha, 2003; Wolff & Pett, 2006) and by the level of satisfaction on 
the part of the founders (Vivarelli & Audretsch, 1998). Performance is influenced by many 
factors in the micro and macro environment such as; years in operation - age (Le & Harvie, 
2010), firm size (Le & Harvie, 2010), networks (BarNir & Smith, 2002; Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003; Huggins, 2001; Lechner, Dowling, & Welpe, 2006; Watson, 2007; Watson, 2011), and 
firm ownerhip (Le & Harvie, 2010) among others. 
Despite the remarkable growth in SMEs in the 30 years of economic reforms in Vietnam, 
empirical studies on the performance of the SMEs and the drivers to SME growth remains 
scarce. Existing studies largely analyze the firm-specific drivers of growth (Li, Meng, Wang, 
& Zhou, 2008; Wu & Chen, 2012). Hence, little is known about how regulatory and 
institutional frameworks impact on SMEs’ growth in many developing countries and in 
Vietnam in particular. Such analysis would be critical to examine the ways to improve the 
regulatory and institutional frameworks under which SMEs operate in Vietnam, where SMEs 
face myriad of challenges ranging from limited access to credit to weak institutions. This 
dissertation addresses these gaps by focusing on the linkages between three topics: access to 
credit, the influence of networks and institutions on performance of SMEs in Vietnam. 
The study findings are elucidated in the following essays of this dissertation, beginning with 
chapter two through chapter four.  
1.2. Access to Credit, Networking and Institutional Factors Affecting Firm Performance 
Access to credit 
Capital plays a crucial role in the development of a firm and lack of it is one of the major 
causes of poor performance of SMEs in developing countries (Fatoki, 2014). There are two 
main public sources of capital for firms, namely stock markets and debts. SMEs face 
difficulties in accessing the stock market capital (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2005), therefore bank credit is their main source of capital (Nguyen, Le, & Freeman, 2006; 
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The United Nations, 2001; World Bank, 2015). However, access to credit is curtailed by 
market imperfections that result in high transaction costs (i.e. search costs for banks) and 
information asymmetries (Beck, 2007). Consequently, cost of credit is significantly higher in 
developing countries - high interest rates and collateral value requirements (UN, 2001). This 
partly explains the poor performance of SMEs in many developing and transition countries. 
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that new SMEs lack broader networks with 
banks, credit and business history that could facilitate investor confidence to inject the much 
needed credit for expansion. The risk management costs of the banks in advancing credit to 
SMEs also increase in such circumstances (Malhotra et al., 2007).  
Firms’ access to credit is influenced by several factors such as; business networks (i.e. with 
banks and other partners), management competence, sector of operation and scale of 
operation (size) among others. Networking in business plays a pivotal role in facilitating 
access to inputs and output markets in general (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; O'Donnell, 2014; 
Watson, 2011). In terms of credit access, each type of network has a different role and effect 
on the probability of receiving (or demanding) credit. In Vietnam, a good network with 
suppliers has a negative effect on access to credit by firms whereas a good network with 
customers has a positive effect on access to credit (Le & Nguyen, 2009). This is because good 
relationship with suppliers enables firm get supplies on credit, resulting in a lower demand for 
bank loans while good relationship with customers, leading to increased sales and their 
demand for credit. Management competencies of firm owners refer to their knowledge, skills, 
and behaviour. Better educated owners have bigger chances of accessing credit (Fatoki & 
Asah, 2011; Fatoki & Odeyemi, 2010) and this is closely linked with ability to develop good 
business plans (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004; Kira & He, 2012).  
Networking and firm performance 
The establishment of business networks is an important initiative in firms’ development (Joel 
A. C. Baum, Tony Calabrese, & Brian S. Silverman, 2000; Lechner et al., 2006). In recent 
years, studies on businesses have focused more on networks, especially the role of network in 
the effectiveness of firm activities in terms of getting supplies at lower prices, credit at lower 
interest rates, selling more products. Beck et al. (2005) find that big enterprises and State-
owned firms are more likely to access bank credit than SMEs. Watson (2007) also find  that 
firms with a larger network have better performance (survival, growth in total income, return 
on equity).  Moreover, SMEs are considered as ‘riskier’ partners for banks (Le & Nguyen, 
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2009). Hence, developing good business networks could significantly influence growth and 
performance of SMEs. 
There are two types of networks, the formal and informal networks (Sue Birley, 1985; 
Watson, 2011). A formal network is that with the bank, with the local government as well as 
other businesses. The informal ones are the network with relatives or friends. From early 
1990s, researchers started examining the role of social networks (i.e. networks with 
acquaintances, friends, and relatives) in growth of firms (BarNir & Smith, 2002; Marsden, 
1990). Apart from the aforementioned benefits of networking, networks also facilitate access 
to information regarding business support programs from local authorities, access to new 
technologies and innovations to increase firm performance. 
Networks can be measured by; the network size, time taken to build the networks (Danis, 
Chiaburu, & Lyles, 2010) and the diversity (type) of networks (Carson, Gilmore, & 
Rocks, 2004). Lechner et al. (2006) find that the size of a network is less important than 
type of network, therefore firms should identify which types of networks is the most 
relevant to their strategies. In conclusion, building a good network can improve firm 
performance therefore firms should invest more to enlarge their networks as well as 
improve the quality of relationship (e.g., frequency of information exchanged and the 
quality of exchanged information). 
Institutional factors and firm performance 
Institional environment in which SMEs operate could also significantly influence 
performance in developing countries (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Murrell, 
2003; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). North (1989) defines institutions 
as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. Institutions can be classified as formal or 
informal (Pejovich, 1999). In less developed countries, the citizenry’s awareness of 
formal laws is limited and formal institutions are rather weak. The citizens largely 
adhere to traditional social norms and local customs that often vary across regions even 
within a country. These customs are sometimes not regulated or embedded in the law but 
could affect enforcement of laws (e.g. by law enforcement) and people’s adherence to 
laws. Hence, institutions affect significantly firms’ activities, structures and 
performance in general (Li & Sun, 2017; Nguyen, Le, & Bryant, 2013). In Vietnam, sub-
national institutions influence firms’ exporting strategies (Nguyen et al. 2013) and also 
ability to attract foreign investment capital (Meyer and Nguyen 2005). 
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In this dissertation, institutional factors are captured using the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI), calculated based on annual survey findings on quality 
public service provision across the provinces. The index helps to assess the business 
environment and quality of public services offered by local authorities and is applicable 
to all firms in the same region.  
Both formal and informal institutions have significantly changed over time in many 
countries at various stages of development, including Vietnam. SMEs often have limited 
adaptability to the changes in business laws due to lack of information and their 
adaptability is often slower than the institutional change (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Murrell, 
2003). Murrell (2003) find that the political changes (i.e. from a centrally planned economy to 
the oriented-market economy) affect firms’ inner structure and management styles.  The 
Vietnamese Government has implemented various policy (law) reforms and innovation 
programs to support growth of SMEs since 1986. Despite this, formal institutions remain 
weak and unstable since laws are semi-autonomously enforced by the authorities in different 
regions and provinces (Tran, Grafton, & Kompas, 2009). Hence, effects of certain regulations 
on SMEs’ performance may be region or province-specific. 
Various panel data models are specified and estimated to analyze performance of SMEs and 
the critical factors affecting SME growth and access to credit as elucidated in the three essays 
of this dissertation. 
1.3. Summary of Chapter Two to Four 
The second chapter of this dissertation presents the first essay that examines the factors 
affecting access to credit by SMEs that were established within the last 42 months prior to the 
study in the Phu Tho province, located in Northern Vietnam. Data were collected from the 
sample of 259 SMEs in face-to-face interviews using semi-structured questionnaires. Both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches were used in the analysis. Probit model was first 
employed to examine the factors influencing the likelihood of accessing credit before 
analysing the factors influencing the intensity of credit acquired (amount of credit/total 
capital) using Tobit model. In addition, focus group discussions (FGD) were held with 10 
firm owners and bank officials of 5 commercial banks in the Phu Tho province to gain a better 
understanding of the business environment of SMEs and issues of credit access by SMEs. 
The probit regression results show that business plan, and networks increased the likelihood 
to obtain bank credit. Further, business plan, emotional trust, and knowledge trust were the 
main factors that influenced bank loan ratio (total credits over total capital). From the FGD 
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findings, SMEs’ credit applications were rejected for the following reasons: (i) the low level 
of collateral; (ii) banks do not trust new SMEs; (iii) the poor networking due to the lack of 
information between firms and banks; (iv) the lack of support from bank officials to help new 
SMEs with their application documents. Other reasons included (i) inefficient production or 
business plan; (ii) the lack of insurance for the collaterals or assets; and (iii) lack of audited 
financial reports.  
Based on the findings, we recommend that the government should create more supportive 
programs such as credit guarantee programs, low interest rate policies, as well as training 
course to improve firm owners’ competencies to improve SMEs’ access to credit.  
The third chapter presents the second essay and explores the effects of different types of 
networks on SME performance in Vietnam using panel dataset from 5-rounds of survey of 
2,500 firms in 10 provinces and cities in Vietnam from 2007 to 2015. The overall sample 
comprises 13,000 observations. Since different types of networks have different effects on 
SME performance (Le & Nguyen, 2009), the effects of the network types were tested by 
estimating separate models for each type of network (network with business people in the 
same sector; network with business people in a different sector; network with bank officials; 
network with politicians and civil servants) on firm performance. Performance was measured 
in terms of; net income, gross margin, growth of revenue, growth of employee, return on 
assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE).  
The results show that network within business sectors (captured as dummy) had mixed effects 
on firm performance - a positive effect on growth rate of employees but a negative effect on 
net income whereas networks with business people in the different sectors positively 
influenced net income, ROA and ROE. In addition, having at least one network with a bank 
helps increase the probability of revenue growth. A good network with a bank increases the 
probability of accessing bank credit that could significantly increase SMEs size and activities. 
These findings are in line with previous studies (Blackwell & Winter, 1997; Le, 2013; Le, 
Venkatesh, & Nguyen, 2006). Having at least one network with a local authority (person 
working with local government) increased net income, growth rate of revenue and number of 
employees. The results are similar to those of previous studies by Li et al. (2008) and Wu and 
Chen (2012). However, having at least one relationship within sector-network, bank and local 
authorities have a negative effect on gross margin (ratio of gross profits to total revenue). 
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In conclusion, each type of network has different effects on firm performance. We 
recommend that firms need to invest more in building networks for better performance. In 
addition, at least one network within the same sector and with banks would be beneficial. 
Chapter four entails the third essay on the effect of institutions on firm performance in each 
province. The effects are analysed using a balanced panel dataset from the Danish 
international development agency (DANIDA) project conducted in 10 provinces and cities 
from the North to the South of Vietnam. The sample consists of 1,173 SMEs, which fully 
participated in 5 rounds from 2007 to 2015, totalling to 5,865 observations.  
Vietnam is implementing administrative reforms to improve the business environment for 
private firms. Therefore, understanding the relationship between quality of public services 
(institutional performance) and firm performance is critical. We find that sub-indices of PCI 
influenced firm performance. Specifically, each sub-index had different effects on firm 
performance. In addition, firm performance was also influenced by entry costs and other 
factors related to firm and firm owners’ characteristics. Low entry costs had negative effects 
on ROA, ROE and gross margins of the already established firms. This is plausible because it 
leads to increased number of firms and thus level of competitiveness which reduces 
performance in the short-run. Findings also show that competence of political leaders 
influenced firm performance by improving quality of public services. Labour training 
programs positively influenced firm performance as well. 
Based on these findings, the local government should be more dynamic, reduce entry costs for 
business startups to promote SME growth and eventually economic growth in the long-run 
through higher GDP, employment and improved social security. This could be enhanced by 
levelling the playing field for both State-owned and private firms to thrive by improving 
public service. 
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents the first essay named “Determinants of New Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises’ Access to Bank Credit: Case Study in the Phu Tho Province, Vietnam”.  
Chapter 3 presents the second essay named “Networks and Firms Performance: A Case Study 
of Vietnamese Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises”.  
Chapter 4 presents the third essay named “How do Institutional Factors affect Firm 
Performance? Evidence from Vietnamese Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises”.   
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 Abstract 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a very important role in the 
Vietnamese economy. Specifically, new SMEs are seen as a suitable solution to cope 
with development issues such as poverty and a high unemployment rate. In Vietnam, a 
high SME failure rate is due to lack of capital and poor managerial experience of 
owners. Most existing research on SMEs focuses on well-established stages, and less 
attention is paid to new SMEs. This paper investigates the determinants of credit access 
by SMEs existing for less than forty-two months in the Phu Tho province located in 
Northern Vietnam. The quantitative data were collected from 259 SMEs in 2015. The 
regression analysis reveals that a business plan, the firm size, and networking 
(emotional trust, knowledge trust, and approachability) are the main drivers of access to 
bank loans by new SMEs. About 64% (165 observations) of new SMEs in our sample 
did not get any bank loan caused by high collateral requirements, unfavorable interest 
rate, poor business plans, limited networking, and lack of the government support. The 
results also indicate that, among the selected explanatory variables, having a concrete 
business plan significantly affects the bank loan ratio (total bank loans over total 
capital). Based on these results, we derived political implications. 
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 2.1. Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a vital role in economic growth worldwide. 
They substantially contribute to economic growth by creating jobs (Chandler, 2012; Hu 
& Schive, 1998; Neumark et al., 2011; Wit & Kok, 2014), reducing poverty (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005), and bringing about innovations (Hemert et al., 2013; Lee et al., 
2010). While large businesses are necessary to preserve and maintain structure within 
economies, SMEs are often considered as main drivers of economic development (Ayodeji & 
Balcioglu, 2010). They account for approximately 95% of total enterprises in the OECD area 
(OECD, 2004), involving many business activities in both domestic and international markets.  
A World Bank report (2015) states that over 50% of SMEs worldwide are in short of capital 
what is considered as a main constraint to their growth. The situation is even worse in many 
developing countries because of high collateral requirements (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2005; Malhotra et al., 2007; Vo, T.C. Tran, V. D. Bui, & D. C. Trinh, 2011), lack of 
managerial skills and ineffective institutional structures (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005), 
limited networking, unfavourable business environment (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2006), limited access to right certificated land, and high administration costs. 
Improving access to finance or bank credit could be a key to overcome these obstacles. As a 
result, governments have implemented several targeted policies to support enterprises, for 
instance, subsidised credit, reducing tax burdens and providing start-up grants. 
Vietnam had succeeded in shifting the planned economy to a market-oriented economy since 
1986. The economy (with a population of nearly 92 million) has continued growing at 6% 
annually in the last five years. Because of its positive development, Vietnam is an interesting 
case study for research on SMEs (World Bank, 2015). According to the General Statistics 
Office (GSO) of Vietnam (2014), the country had 324,691 enterprises, 258,656 (80%) of which 
were micro enterprises, 14% were small, and only 4% were medium size. These SMEs generate 
approximately 40% of annual gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, more than half of all 
employed Vietnamese citizens work in SMEs. Like other developing and transition countries, 
the Vietnamese government emphasises the importance of SMEs for long-term development. 
For example, the government has introduced numerous policies such as an economic reform 
programme (1986), the Company Law and Private Enterprise Law (1990). These laws were 
amended to the Enterprise Law (2005), the Decree No. 56/2009/ND-CP (2009) in order to 
support the development of SMEs. Recently, the Decision No.58 (2013) was implemented to set 
up an SME credit guarantee fund. 
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 However, the growth contribution of SMEs is not likely to be sustained without establishing 
and supporting new businesses. Failures of SMEs occurred especially after the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008. In order to offset the failures, new SMEs are required. According to the GSO 
(2014), there were 76,955 enterprises set up in 2013, but also 60,737 enterprises failed due to 
the lack of capital. The majority of Vietnamese SMEs begin the business with capital from 
internal sources (e.g., borrowing from their families, friends, and relatives). Most of the time, 
such sources are not sufficient to adequately support the business development. As a result, 
bank loans could play a very important role as an external funding source for the long-term 
development of SMEs. 
Financial constraints are a major source of business failure in developing countries. 
However, to our best understanding, previous research has not well analysed the determinants 
of securing access to financing for new SMEs in developing countries, especially not in 
Vietnam. We aim to close this research gap by exploring the determinants of access to finance 
for new SMEs in Northern Vietnam. 
We try to understand how new SMEs acquire finance and identify drivers of access to 
finance. The term “new” SMEs could mean new firms, newly founded firms, or newly created 
firms, meaning those firms which begin at the business plan stage (Reynolds, 1987; Robb & 
Robinson, 2013). In this paper, the term “new” SMEs refers to those enterprises that have 
existed for less than forty-two months (Luong, Pham, Le, Doan, & Doan, 2016; Maas & 
Herrington, 2007). 
For a definition of SMEs, we followed the Vietnamese Decree No. 56 (2009): “SMEs are 
enterprises have registered capitals less than VND 100 billion (USD 4.5 million) or an 
average number of annual employees of less than 300.”  
The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on access to 
debt finance of SMEs in developing countries. Section 3 provides the research methodology 
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 shows the regression results. Finally, the article 
closes with a conclusion and suggests implications to policy-makers and SMEs’ owners in 
developing countries. 
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. SMEs’ Financing Problems in Developing Countries 
Bank loans have been considered a crucial element for the growth process of SMEs not only 
in developed countries but also in developing countries (Nguyen et al., 2006; The United 
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 Nations, 2001; World Bank, 2015). Compared to larger enterprises, SMEs have less access to 
finance provided by banks, stock markets or private equity markets (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2005). As major constraints for SMEs in developing countries to access external bank 
loans, Beck (2007) found high transaction costs and asymmetric information. In addition to 
these two constraints, the United Nations (2001) pointed out high interest rates and 
insufficient assets.  
Asymmetric information occurs when one business partner cannot provide full information to 
the contracting party (Le, 2013; Malhotra et al., 2007). Le (2013) illustrates that a borrowing 
SME itself has more information about the credit risk than the bank providing the credit. 
SMEs usually know the specific market conditions in the markets they operate in better than 
banks. They are also more aware of risks within small enterprises such as their productivity, 
their operational capacity, the condition of the machines and facilities, etc. To solve the 
problem of asymmetric information, banks or financial institutions have applied common 
strategies, e.g., collateral requirement, collecting information on SMEs, building networks, 
and applying strict contracts.  
Measures to resolve asymmetric information regularly raise transaction costs, which are the 
major obstacle for SMEs’ access to bank loans. Transaction costs are considered a main 
constraint for the access of SMEs to credit (Malhotra et al., 2007). The cost is measured by 
summing up the costs from borrowers and lenders to give their decisions related to the 
exchange of credit. It is caused by the imperfect information in credit markets (Le, 2013). 
The relationship between newly founded firms and banks or financial suppliers generally is 
very weak. Banks have to search for information from their clients and predict their actions. 
Transaction costs are higher if banks have to hand out many small loans that require more 
administration work to control risks (Malhotra et al., 2007). SMEs also experience transaction 
costs if they have to provide information or invest in networks in order to secure credits 
(Malhotra et al., 2007). 
For our paper, the question is crucial whether new SMEs have more constraints to access 
bank loans than more mature SMEs. The literature on the access of new SMEs to credit is 
limited. Only few studies explore the situation in developed countries (Reynolds, 1987). For 
example, Reynolds (1987) found that new SMEs in the United States frequently did not 
succeed due to financial constraints in their second or third year of operation. 
Puhakka (2007) indicated that research on business organisations is switching from the 
management of existing firms to the creation of new firms. This is because of the 
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 importance of new businesses in changing the competition in the business environment. In 
addition, policy makers have agreed that the creation of new SMEs reduces 
unemployment and poverty rates, especially in developing countries. Li and Daly (2005) 
point out that new SMEs trigger competition, stir research, development and innovation, 
push old firms to improve their efficiency, and result in economic growth, technological 
upgrading, job creation and welfare improvement.  
Fatoki (2014) argues that successful new SMEs are likely to add significant benefits to 
regional and national economies. The benefits are likely to take the form of new products, 
new jobs, greater exports and taxation revenues. Bruce et al. (2009) found that the number of 
births of new SMEs adds significantly to a country’s GDP. Therefore, new SMEs provide 
long-term benefits to the local economy. Maas and Herrington (2007) endorse the argument 
that new SMEs make a significant difference to economic prosperity and that South Africa 
risks economic stagnation without a high new SME creation rate. Countries that are able to 
replenish the stock of businesses and jobs and have the capacity to accommodate volatility 
and turbulence in the entrepreneurial sector are best placed to compete effectively. In 
countries ranking high in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) analysis, 
entrepreneurship and new SME creation is an integral and accepted feature of economic and 
personal life. 
The two external financial sources for new SMEs are equity and debt. In Vietnam, external 
equity in form of stock exchange is not available for new SMEs because they are usually not 
able to meet the entry requirements of stock exchange. Moreover, venture capitalists often 
invest in firms at middle or later stages of their life cycle. Venture capital in Vietnam is 
especially scarce (Scheela & Nguyen, 2004). External equity in form of venture capital or 
stock exchange is limited for new SMEs in Vietnam. Le (2013) found that SMEs with a closer 
bank relationship have a higher probability of receiving a bank loan. However, it is also 
difficult for firm owners to build up their networks with bank officers. Therefore, new SMEs 
rely on bank loans and informal credits from friends or relatives for their early stage 
financing. However, SMEs are generally considered to be riskier than large firms. SMEs 
confront several barriers in order to access bank loans, such as lack of collaterals, banks’ 
unwillingness to lend to SMEs, and high interest rates. Nguyen and Luu (2013) reported that 
75% of SMEs interviewed would like to seek bank loans but only 30% of them succeeded. 
Results from the enterprise survey in Vietnam reveal that 71% of small firms (5-19 
employees) were not able to access bank loans in comparison to 44% of medium firms (20-99 
20 
 
 employees). These numbers show that financial services providing credit for SMEs are 
insufficient (World Bank, 2015). 
2.2.2. Determinants of the Access of New SMEs to Bank Loans 
Determinants of access to bank loans could be networking, managerial competence, business 
information, the sector of the economic activity, firm size and the firm’s location. In this 
section, we review some relevant literature regarding access to bank loans. 
Networking in a small firm context is an activity in which entrepreneurially oriented SME 
owners build and manage personal relationships with particular individuals in their 
surroundings. Networking is one of the most important means for the access of SME owners 
to resources or inputs and for them to market their goods and services (Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003; O'Donnell, 2014; Watson, 2011). According to Le and Nguyen (2009), networking with 
suppliers has a significantly negative correlation to the use of bank loans while networking 
with customers is positively related to it. Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) indicated that 
SMEs having a larger networking were able to receive more trade credit and other resources 
for their operations, and SMEs that pay more attention to their relationship with banks will 
incur more debt, especially short-term debt. Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010) found that new SMEs 
with owners who can rely on previous relationships with banks are significantly more likely 
to be successful in their credit applications. For China, Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou (2008) 
found that private firm owners who are members of the Communist Party are more likely to 
receive bank loans.  
Managerial competencies are sets of knowledge, skills, behaviours and attitudes that 
contribute to personal effectiveness as a manager. Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010) and Fatoki 
and Asah (2011) found that new SMEs in South Africa managed by owners with a high 
education level and related business experience are more likely to be successful in their 
credit application.  
Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010) indicated that SMEs with a business plan are more likely to be 
successful in their credit application than those that do not have a business plan. If SMEs have 
and can provide more business information, their likelihood of applying for finance increases 
since they are familiar with regulations and requirements of lenders (banks or credit funds; 
Fatoki & Asah, 2011; Kira & He, 2012).   
Access to debt financing is positively related to the sector of a firm. Most of the sources of 
financing prefer lending to manufacturing sectors while other sectors are rather left 
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 unsupported (Kira & He, 2012). Le (2012) found that industry dummies are statistically 
significant to the probability of obtaining a bank loan.  
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) showed that a larger firm size tends to provide greater 
access to long-term debt. This is also supported by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006), Kira 
and He (2012), and Mulaga (2013). They all found that larger firms have a higher access 
to debt financing than smaller ones. For South Africa, Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010) and 
Fatoki and Asah (2011) found that firm size is positively associated with access to 
finance. The positive relationship between firm size and the access to bank loans is also 
demonstrated for Vietnam (Le, 2012). 
Kira and He (2012) found that a positive relationship between a firm’s location and its debt 
ratio. Firms located in urban areas have a higher possibility to receive bank loans than firms 
located in rural areas in South Africa (Fatoki & Asah, 2011; Fatoki & Odeyemi, 2010). 
Another determinant is the maturity of a firm measured in years. A higher age of a firm brings 
about a positive effect on the probability of getting a bank loan (Fatoki & Asah, 2011; Kira 
& He, 2012; Le, 2012).  
2.3. Research Methodology 
2.3.1 Data Collection 
Data for the study were collected in the Phu Tho province in Northern Vietnam over the 
course of four months from May to August 2015 using a simple random technique (Creswell, 
2009; Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010). The province is known as an old industrial area 
but now a growing number of small and medium sized enterprises chose the province as their 
location (see table 2.1). The majority of its population lives in rural areas and supplies many 
SMEs with a large number of labourers.  
(Insert table 2.1 here) 
The overall targeted population in Phu Tho for our study was around 1,200 new SMEs (Phu 
Tho Province, 2015). The Raosoft1 sample size calculator (margin of error: 5%; confidence 
interval: 95%; response distribution: 50%) suggests a minimum recommended sample size of 
292 observations.  
Based on the list of new SMEs from the Phu Tho Tax Bureau and the Planning and 
Investment Department (including telephone numbers and email addresses) covering one 
1 Raosoft is a free software used to calculate the sample size in our survey. 
Source: http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html 
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 city and twelve districts belonging to the Phu Tho province, we took two steps selecting 
interviewed firms. Firstly, we purposely chose one city and six districts to represent urban 
and rural areas. Secondly, we randomly selected firms from the list from each selected 
district-level unit. A total of 350 questionnaires were handed out, 289 (82%) were 
returned, 259 (74%) of which were fully completed both in urban and rural areas. Owners 
or representatives of SMEs were asked several open-ended questions relating to general 
characteristics of firms, financing, business information, and managerial, networking 
characteristics. Data were then entered with the SPSS package and analysed with STATA. 
(Insert figure 2.1 here) 
We set up a team of enumerators who are native to the province conducted the survey. They 
were trained in both data collection methods and the reasons behind each item in the 
questionnaire in four days. After training activities, the enumerators did a pre-test for the 
questionnaire with some enterprise owners. The survey covers solely new SMEs defined by 
capital less than VND 100 billion (USD 4.5 million) or less than 300 employees (The 
Vietnamese Government, 2009). The enumerators directly contacted the selected new SMEs 
via email or telephone to make appointments with SME owners. Then the enumerators came 
to enterprises to hand in the questionnaire, explaining the reasons of conducting the survey. 
The enumerators had to follow up the surveyed firms and came back to collect the 
completed questionnaires. 
2.3.2. Model Specifications and Hypotheses 
We estimated two models: a probit model estimates the probability to receive a bank loan, a 
tobit model estimates the bank loan ratio as an additional measure. Both models use the same 
set of explanatory variables. The variable “networking” was combined of four main 
dimensions (emotional trust, knowledge trust, approachability, and personal sharing). To 
construct this variable, the firm owners were asked to select the level of relationships between 
firms and bank’s credit official based on a 5-point Likert scale. Factor analysis was employed 
to build the four dimensions used in the models. Another explanatory variable is managerial 
competence, also measured by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very bad; 5 = very good). These five 
items have a reliability test with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.899 (see table 2.9). The selected 
independent variables are shown in greater detail in table 2.8. 
(Insert figure 2.2 here) 
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 To analyses whether there is a correlation between firms, owners’ characteristics and access 
to bank loans, a simple probit model was applied (1) to find out which factors influence the 
probability of SMEs successfully getting a bank loan.  
Probit model:  probability of getting a bank loan  
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽1 +  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,                                            (1) 
There is a large body of literature on the drivers of access to bank loans (𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ ). Most studies 
prefer a logistic regression (e.g., logit and probit models) to find out how selected independent 
variables affect the dichotomous variable (Coleman, 2000). Having a bank loan in 2014 is a 
dummy variable, and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables expected to influence the 
probability of receiving a bank loan. A probit model is suitable for analysing regression where 
the dependent variable only has two values (Greene, 2012; Wooldridge, 2010). Explanatory 
variables are networking, managerial competency, business information, firm industry, firm 
size, firm location, and owners’/managers’ characteristics. 
Secondly, we divided the sample into two groups (one that did and one that did not have a bank 
loan in the fiscal year 2014). To examine the intensity of a bank loan (the percentage of bank 
loans), a tobit model was applied (2). 
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽2 +  µ𝑖𝑖,                                            (2) 
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 =  �𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗ , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽2 + µ𝑖𝑖 > 00, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                                        (3) 
Following Blackwell and Winter (1997), Le and Nguyen (2009) and Mulaga (2013), we used 
the bank loan ratio measured by total bank credit over the total capital stock of the enterprise 
as a dependent variable in our model. This ratio does not depend on firm size, thus it is 
suitable for measuring the ability of access to bank loans. As the bank loan ratio is a 
continuous dependent variable including zero value, we applied a tobit model (Verbeek, 
2004). In our study, a substantial part of the SMEs has a bank loan ratio equal to zero while 
the rest of our sample has a positive value. 
The bank loan ratio of new SMEs is given by y2i∗ .  X2i is the vector of explanatory variables 
expected to have an influence on the bank loan ratio. The two error terms vi and µi are 
expected to be independent and normally distributed with vi ≈N(0,1); µi ≈ N(0,σ2). 
Based on the literature review and our conceptual framework, we hypothesise: 
- H1: there is a positive relationship between the level of networking and the access to bank 
loans for new SMEs. 
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 - H2: there is a positive relationship between the managerial competence and the access to 
bank loans for new SMEs. 
- H3: there is a positive relationship between business information and the access to bank 
loans for new SMEs. 
- H4: new SMEs in trade and service have more credit constraints than those in 
manufacturing. 
- H5: new micro and small firms have more credit constraints than new medium ones. 
- H6: new SMEs in rural areas have more credit constraints than the ones in urban areas. 
2.4. Results and Discussion 
2.4.1. Characteristics of the Sample 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the SMEs in our sample of 
259 new SMEs, 71% of which were companies with limited liability, 20% were shareholding 
companies, and only 9% were private companies. The number of employees in new SMEs 
range from 1 to 125. The capital stock of SMEs varied between VND2 30 million to 104,423 
million (USD 1,300 to 4,700,000). There was 47% of the companies focus on trading while 
31% concentrate mainly on service, and only 22% focus on manufacturing. In terms of 
location, 53% of the firms are located in an urban area, and 47% in rural areas. 
Regarding the owners’ characteristics, 76% of the owners are male, and 24% are female. 
About 50% of the owners have a university degree. The owners’ management experience 
ranges from 1 to 20 years. 
(Insert table 2.2 here) 
Regarding the access to bank loans, about 36% of firms received loans from banks while 64% 
did not. The range of bank loans over the total capital defined as the bank loan ratio ranged 
from 0.03 to 0.83.  
Table 2.3 presents mean values and T-tests of the mean difference3 of the variables in the 
regression analysis. Using T-tests, we found that most of the variables are significantly 
different (except those variables regarding the owners’ characteristics) between bank loan 
recipients and non-recipients. Overall, the recipients seem to have more experience in 
management skills and are more active in networking with banks. Furthermore, recipient 
SMEs have significantly more business plans (56%) than non-recipient SMEs (only 25% had 
2USD 1.00 = VND 22,000 at the time of the survey 
3 Tests comparing SMEs that received a bank loan or that did not. 
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 a plan). Finally, recipient SMEs have a larger firm size (measured by number of employees) 
than those which did not receive a bank loan. 
(Insert table 2.3 here) 
In order to discover the multicollinearity issues of selected independent variables in the 
model, we run a correlation matrix (see table 2.10). From the matrix, we found that service is 
positively correlated with the trade sector. Educational level is negatively associated with age. 
Manager experience is negatively correlated with the service sector but positively associated 
with age. Manager skills are correlated with the education level and manager experience. Firm 
size is negatively correlated with the trade sector but positively associated with the business 
plan and manager skills. Emotional trust has positive associations with the business plan. 
Knowledge trust is also positively correlated with the business plan, age, firm size and 
emotional trust. Approachability is negatively correlated with age and knowledge trust; 
however, it is positively associated with emotional trust. Interestingly, personal sharing has 
positive associations with manager skills, emotional trust, knowledge trust, and 
approachability. Finally, location is negatively correlated with plan and gender, but has a 
positive relation to the educational level. Since selected explanatory variables are not highly 
correlated, all variables are put in the regression models in the next two sections. 
2.4.2 Determinants of Receiving a Bank Loan  
The empirical results of the probit model are presented in table 2.4. Overall, the model can 
explain 20.6% of the change of probability of receiving a loan (R2 = 0.206 at 1% significant 
level). This implies that the set of selected explanatory variables reliably distinguishes 
between firms with a bank loan and firms without a bank loan. The marginal effects (ME) of 
each model helps to better understand the magnitude of the effect of an independent variable 
on the probability of receiving bank loans. 
(Insert table 2.4 here) 
SMEs which have a business plan have a 16.4% higher probability to receive a bank loan 
compared to new SMEs without a business plan. This supports hypothesis H3. New SMEs’ 
lack for data on past business history and low financial information as well as limited ability 
to put together a business plan make them more likely to fail in acquiring a bank loan.  
Among the firms’ characteristics, firm size had a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of getting a bank loan, supporting hypothesis H5. The bigger firms with more 
assets as collateral are 11.8% more likely to obtain a bank loan. 
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 In addition, variables such as emotional trust, knowledge trust, and approachability of bank 
officers all have a statistically positive influence on the probability of getting a bank loan. It is 
not surprising that new SMEs with a good relationship to banks are more likely to receive a 
bank loan, supporting hypothesis H1. 
In order to further analyse the effect of location on the probability of access to bank loans, we 
ran two additional models with independent variables (see table 2.4). Overall, there is no 
difference in our sample between SMEs located in rural and those located in urban areas, 
whereby hypothesis H6 is not supported.  
2.4.3 Factors Influencing the Bank Loan Ratio 
Factors influencing the bank loan ratio are shown in table 2.5. The estimated tobit model was 
employed to examine whether selected explanatory variables such managerial competency, 
business information, networking, industry, firm size, or location influence the bank loan 
ratio. The model is statistically significant with R2 = 0.217 (Chi2 = 0.0000). 
As expected, a business plan positively influences the bank loan ratio at a highly significant 
level. The bank loan ratio of those new SMEs that had a business plan is 19% higher than that 
of SMEs without one.  
The results for emotional trust (Coef = 0.11868 at 5% significant level), knowledge trust 
(Coef = 0.09677 at 1% significant level), and approachability of bank officers (Coef = 
0.10570 at 1% significant level) were both positively and significantly related to the bank 
loan ratio.  
(Insert table 2.5 here) 
2.4.4. Reasons for not Receiving a Bank Loan 
Table 2.6 summaries the reasons for surveyed SMEs not getting a bank loan. 
(Insert table 2.6 here) 
There are many financing constraints such as high interest rates, complex application 
processes, high collateral requirement from banks, and the lack of a business plan. In our 
sample 42.3% (110 firms) of new SMEs did not apply for any bank loan. Reasons include the 
complexity of loan application procedures, a high interest rate and high collateral 
requirements. About 19% of those firms are self-financed in the first years of operation. 
Interestingly, those new SMEs that did not apply for any bank loan believed that they would 
not be successful. In general, they had a short networking with banks officers, a lack of 
collateral assets, none or poor business plans and a low ability to write the application.  
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 The proportion of new businesses that applied for but did not receive a loan was about 21.2% 
of the total sample. In order to understand why new SMEs failed to obtain a bank loan despite 
having applied for it, we conducted a focus group discussion shortly after the survey with 10 
owners of SMEs. The reasons for the rejection of loan applications were: (i) low level of 
collateral; (ii) banks do not trust in new SMEs; (iii) poor networking due to the lack of 
information between firms and banks; (iv) lack of support from bank officers to help new 
SMEs with their application documents. 
A focus group discussion with bank officers also took place after our survey. Five commercial 
bank officers in the province who work closely with new SMEs participated in the discussion 
illustrating the reasons why banks rejected to provide financial means to firms. The main 
findings were: (i) inefficient production or business project; (ii) lack of collateral and assets’ 
insurance; (iii) lack of audited financial reports. 
2.5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper has investigated factors influencing bank financing to new SMEs in Vietnam. 
We mainly focused on new SMEs in the Phu Tho province in Northern Vietnam and their 
current access to bank loans. The literature suggests many constraints for obtaining 
sufficient bank loans such as lack of managerial skills, weak relationship with banks, and 
high transactions costs. We applied several specifications such as descriptive statistics, 
and probit and tobit regressions.  
Overall, the results support our hypotheses which included business information, managerial 
competency, networking and firm characteristics. Having a good business plan positively 
influences the probability of getting a bank loan. New SMEs with a business plan are more 
likely to receive a bank loan as opposed to SMEs without a business plan; further analysis 
about determining the bank loan ratio also reveals that a business plan is important. Firm size 
has a positive effect on receiving a bank loan. New small firms are more likely to get a bank 
loan in comparison with new micro firms. However, firm size is not significant with regard to 
the bank loan ratio in the tobit model. To avoid lending risks, banks demand collateral from 
micro firms or provide a loan with a high interest rate. Unfortunately, micro firms do not 
usually have assets to offer as bank loan collaterals. The results also indicate that networking 
factors positively and significantly influence the grant of a bank loan and the bank loan ratio. 
In addition, there are about 60% of new SMEs in our sample that did not get any access to 
formal external credit sources. This fact could lead to the failure of new firms due to the lack 
of sufficient capital to keep their business in operation. Based on these findings, we argue that 
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 credit denial mainly depends on poor business plans. This is of particular importance for 
managers of new small businesses. 
As the rate of failure of new SMEs is high, more support from the government could help 
SMEs to grow, to provide jobs and to contribute to regional growth. It can be suggested that 
the government should encourage the development of SMEs by implementing credit 
guarantee programmes, focusing more on credit interest policies (subsidising), and improving 
owners’ capacity for management, especially in start-up companies. The government should 
pay more attention to the financing market and provide concrete proper financial information 
(availability, interest rate, requirements, and supported policies). It is recommended that start-
up training programmes should focus more on owners or managers of new SMEs to assist 
them in developing their business plans properly. It is also important for new firm owners to 
take writing their business plans more seriously since it will be the key principle for their 
success in doing business, as well as pay more attention on the credit application and 
compliance process. 
We acknowledge several limitations of our research. The access to bank loans (recipients and 
non-recipients) might lead to biased and inconsistent coefficients. In such a case, the 
advanced method like propensity score matching that controls the selection bias could be 
employed. It is also important to explore the long-term effect of the access to bank loans on 
firm performance by using panel data.  
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 Table 2.1. New Business Registration and Failure in the Phu Tho Province 2012-2016 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
- SMEs established 317 464 405 548 717 
- SMEs closed down 140 198 939 496 300 
- SMEs bankrupted 23 29 69 46 30 
Source: The Phu Tho Tax Bureau, 2017 
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Entire Sample 
 Absolute number Percentage (%) 
Legal Status   
- Shareholding companies 52 20.08 
- Limited liability companies 183 70.66 
- Private companies 24 9.27 
Firm Size (number of employees)   
- Range 1-125  
- Mean 11.143  
- Std. deviation 15.338  
Total Capital (in million VND)   
- Range 30 - 104,423  
- Mean 3,970.486  
- Std. deviation 8,801.347  
Firm Industry   
- Trade enterprises 120 46.51 
- Service enterprises 80 31.01 
- Manufacturing enterprises 58 22.48 
Location   
- Urban area 138 53.28 
- Rural area 121 46.72 
Owner Gender   
- Male 196 75.68 
- Female 63 24.32 
Owner Education   
- Have a university degree 129 49.81 
- Do not have a university degree 130 50.19 
Owner Experience   
- Range 1-20  
- Mean 4.822  
- Std. deviation 4.264  
Access to Bank Loans   
- Have not borrowed 165 63.71 
- Have borrowed 94 36.29 
Bank Loan/Capital 94*  
- Range 0.028-0.833  
- Mean 0.359  
- Std. deviation 0.216  
N 259  
Note: * Total number of new SMEs that received bank loans in the sample. 
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 Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics for Recipients of Bank Loans 
Variables 
Non-recipients 
(N = 165) 
Recipients 
(N = 94) 
Differences 
Trade (1 = SME focuses on trading) 0.418 0.553 -0.135** 
Service (1 = SME focuses on service) 0.376 0.191 0.184*** 
Plan (1 = yes) 0.255 0.564 -0.309*** 
Age (in years) 41.091 42.894 -1.803 
Gender (1 = male) 0.758 0.755 0.002 
Education level (1 = having a 
university degree) 
0.491 0.511 -0.020 
Manager experience (in years) 4.461 5.457 -0.997* 
Manager skillsa 3.610 3.653 -0.043 
Firm size (1 = small firm) 0.200 0.383 -0.183*** 
Emotional trustb 1.742 2.149 -0.407*** 
Knowledge trustb 2.995 3.779 -0.784*** 
Approachabilityb 3.822 4.121 -0.298** 
Personal sharingb 2.409 2.654 -0.245* 
Location (1 = located in urban area) 0.539 0.521 0.018 
N 259   
Note: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
a: Those variables were measured by using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very bad; 5 = very 
good) 
b: Those variables were measured by using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree) 
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 Table 2.4. Factors Influencing Credit Access by Probit Model 
Variables Full sample Urban firms Rural firms Coef ME Coef ME Coef ME 
       
Trade (1 = SME focuses on 
trading) 
0.24426 0.0716 0.24382 0.0743 0.30998 0.0803 
 (0.25313) (0.0735) (0.38586) (0.117) (0.37163) (0.0955) 
Service (1 = SME focuses on 
service) 
-0.29480 -0.0864 -0.07689 -0.0234 -0.62186 -0.161 
 (0.25490) (0.0744) (0.34238) (0.104) (0.42896) (0.109) 
Plan (1 = yes) 0.55919*** 0.164*** 0.63965** 0.195** 0.59068** 0.153** 
 (0.19207) (0.0534) (0.27449) (0.0789) (0.27616) (0.0692) 
Age (in years) -0.00360 -0.00106 0.00068 0.000209 0.00203 0.000527 
 (0.01067) (0.00312) (0.01463) (0.00446) (0.01606) (0.00416) 
Gender (1 = male) -0.00339 -0.000995 0.14026 0.0428 -0.32367 -0.0839 
 (0.21739) (0.0637) (0.27311) (0.0832) (0.36842) (0.0957) 
Education level (1 = having a 
university degree) 
0.04421 0.0130 -0.02929 -0.00893 0.16810 0.0436 
 (0.18345) (0.0538) (0.24278) (0.0740) (0.29078) (0.0751) 
Manager experience (in years) 0.02767 0.00811 0.02694 0.00821 0.02931 0.00759 
 (0.02260) (0.00658) (0.03280) (0.00997) (0.03386) (0.00867) 
Manager skillsa -0.08085 -0.0237 -0.12922 -0.0394 -0.01543 -0.00400 
 (0.16799) (0.0493) (0.24379) (0.0745) (0.24340) (0.0630) 
Firm size (1 = small firm) 0.40152* 0.118* 0.53135 0.162* 0.15731 0.0408 
 (0.22119) (0.0631) (0.32469) (0.0956) (0.33304) (0.0858) 
Emotional trustb 0.29371** 0.0861** 0.34600* 0.105* 0.27140 0.0703 
 (0.14378) (0.0410) (0.20924) (0.0610) (0.19382) (0.0498) 
Knowledge trustb 0.26741*** 0.0784*** 0.14178 0.0432 0.43111*** 0.112*** 
 (0.09815) (0.0280) (0.14889) (0.0453) (0.13230) (0.0313) 
Approachabilityb 0.28380** 0.0832** 0.20167 0.0615 0.37374* 0.0968** 
 (0.12563) (0.0355) (0.17494) (0.0521) (0.19193) (0.0473) 
Personal sharingb 0.04229 0.0124 0.04068 0.0124 0.06015 0.0156 
 (0.11472) (0.0336) (0.16021) (0.0488) (0.16555) (0.0428) 
Location (1 = located in urban 
area) 
-0.04278 -0.0125     
 (0.18599) (0.0545)     
Constant -3.11712***  -2.67559*  -4.21327***  
 (1.00839)  (1.48796)  (1.48498)  
       
Observations 259  138  121  
R2 0.2059***  0.1709  0.2964***  
Wald chi2 51.51  21.89  42.30  
       
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coef: coefficients; ME: marginal effect 
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 Table 2.5. Factors Influencing the Bank Loan Ratio by Tobit Model 
Variables Coefficients 
  
Trade (1 = SME focus on trading) 0.10123 
 (0.08344) 
Service (1 = SME focus on service) -0.11198 
 (0.09488) 
Plan (1 = yes) 0.19449*** 
 (0.06715) 
Age (in years) 0.00014 
 (0.00380) 
Gender (1 = male) 0.02849 
 (0.07528) 
Education level (1 = having a university degree) 0.02738 
 (0.06603) 
Manager experience (in years) 0.00635 
 (0.00814) 
Manager skillsa -0.04471 
 (0.05918) 
Firm size (1 = small firm) 0.06265 
 (0.07506) 
Emotional trustb 0.11868** 
 (0.04656) 
Knowledge trustb 0.09677*** 
 (0.03550) 
Approachabilityb 0.10570*** 
 (0.03981) 
Personal sharingb 0.01054 
 (0.03669) 
Location (1 = located in urban area) -0.02771 
 (0.06724) 
Constant -1.13684*** 
 (0.33698) 
Observations 259 
R2 0.2172 
Wald chi2 0.0000 
Sigma 0.40295*** 
 (0.03337) 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 2.6. Reasons for New SMEs without Credit 
 Absolute 
number 
Percentage (%) 
Applied for a bank loan but did not get all financing 
requested 
55 100 
- The application was rejected  44 80 
- Refused because interest rates are too high  9 16.36 
- Refused because of insufficient size of loan 1 1.82 
- Other 1 1.82 
Did not apply for any bank loan 110 100 
- Firm has sufficient internal funds 21 19.09 
- Application procedures for loans or lines of credit are 
complex 
13 11.82 
- Interest rates are not favourable 15 13.64 
- Collateral requirements are too high 13 11.82 
- Size of loan is insufficient 4 3.64 
- Maturity of loan is insufficient 2 1.82 
- Do not think it would be approved 42 38.18 
- Other 0 0 
N (number of observations) 165  
Source: authors’ calculations from the survey in 2015. 
 
Table 2.7. The Definition of SMEs in Vietnam 
Type of firm 
Number of 
employees 
Total capital 
Micro 1-10  
Small 11-200 Maximum VND 20 billion (USD 900 000) 
Medium 201-300 VND 20 - 100 billion (USD 4.5 million) 
Source: Decree No. 56 (2009) 
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 Table 2.8. Independent Variables Used in Logistic Regression Analysis 
Variables Measurement 
1. Dependent Variable 
 Getting a bank loan 1 = had a bank loan; 0 = did not have a bank loan  
 Bank loan ratio Bank loan ratio = bank loan over total capital  
2. Independent Variables 
 Managerial competency Education level 
Management experience 
Managerial skills* 
 
 Business information Business plan  
 
Networking Emotional trust* 
Knowledge trust* 
Approachability* 
Personal sharing* 
 
 Firm industry Service; trade; manufacturing  
 Firm size Micro; small; medium  
 Firm location 1 = urban area; 0 = rural area  
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 Table 2.9. Measuring Manager Skills, Emotional Trust, Knowledge Trust, Approachability of 
Bank Officers, and Personal Information Sharing 
 
Manager Skills 
Five items (D1.3.6, D1.3.7, D1.3.8, D1.3.9, D1.3.10) were extracted to measure the 
managers’ skills. The scale of these five items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .899. However, if 
the fourth item (D1.3.9 -risk taking) was dropped, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .902. 
Therefore, I decided to drop it and to use the other four items (D1.3.6, D1.3.7, D1.3.8, and 
D1.3.10) to measure the managers’ skills. 
Emotional Trust 
There were five items (E.1.5, E.1.6, E.1.7, E.1.8, and E.1.9) extracted to measure emotional 
trust. The scale of these five items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .843. However, if the first item 
(E1.5- You rely on the bank official(s) to find ways of meeting business’s changing financial 
needs) was dropped, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .882. Therefore, I decided to drop it 
and to use the other four items (E.1.6, E.1.7, E.1.8, E.1.9) to measure emotional trust. 
Knowledge Trust 
Four items (E.1.1, E.1.2, E.1.3, E.1.4) were extracted to measure knowledge trust. These four 
items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .876. All these four items were kept to measure this factor. 
Approachability of Bank Officers 
There were three items (E.1.12, E.1.13, E.1.14) extracted to measure approachability. These 
three items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .819. All three items, therefore, were kept to measure 
approachability of bank officers. 
Personal Information Sharing 
There were two items (E.1.10, E.1.11) extracted to measure personal information sharing. 
These two items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .718. Therefore, all two items were retained for 
this measure. 
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 Results of Factor Analysis 
 
Description 
Cronbach’s 
alpha if 
item 
deleted 
 Manager Skills  
D1.3.6 Managerial skills .883 
D1.3.7 Analytical skills .867 
D1.3.8 Creativity .866 
D1.3.9 Risk-taking .902 
D1.3.10 Innovation .863 
 α = .899  
 Emotional Trust  
E1.5 You rely on the bank official(s) to find ways of meeting your 
business’s changing financial needs 
.801 
E1.6 You get to know the bank credit official(s) (background, 
personal life, habits, etc.) 
.788 
E1.7 You attend the important events of their personal life (e.g., 
wedding or funeral of their family’s member) 
.795 
E1.8 When appropriate, you give this/these bank official(s) some gifts .791 
E1.9 You get together with them on some holiday occasions .882 
 α = .843  
 Knowledge Trust  
E1.1 The bank official(s) is/are available to help in a crisis .817 
E1.2 You trust the advice from your bank official(s) .840 
E1.3 You are confident that the bank official(s) understand your 
business 
.844 
E1.4 The bank official(s) often come forward with positive 
suggestions to help your business 
.862 
 α = .876  
 Approachability of bank officers  
E1.12 You prefer to avoid contact with bank officials .786 
E1.13 The bank official(s) is/are not interested in your business .749 
E1.14 You feel intimidated when dealing with (a) bank official(s) .716 
 α = .819  
 Personal Information Sharing  
E1.10 You share with this/these bank credit official(s) some of your 
own personal information (e.g., background, personal life) 
 
E1.11 You feel free to share with this/these bank credit official(s) your 
ideas, feelings, hopes, or problems that may not directly relate to 
business 
 
 α = .718  
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Table 2.10. Correlation Matrix 
Note: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
  Trade Service Plan Age Gender Edu- Mana_ex Mana_sk Firm Size Emot- Know- Appr- Pers- Location 
1. Trade (1 = SME focuses on 
trading) 
1              
2. Service (1 = SME focuses on 
service) 
-0.6260* 1             
3. Plan (1 = yes) 0.0581 -0.0927 1            
4. Age (in years) 0.0565 -0.102 0.0316 1           
5. Gender (1 = male) -0.0463 -0.0300 -0.0913 -0.00670 1          
6. Education level (1 = having a 
university degree) 
-0.0815 0.00260 -0.00510 -0.2016* -0.0292 1         
7. Manager experience (in years) 0.0627 -0.1468* 0.0562 0.3767* -0.0850 0.0107 1        
8. Manager skillsa -0.0229 -0.0798 -0.00590 -0.0120 0.0506 0.1913* 0.1710* 1       
9. Firm size (1 = small firm) -0.2142* -0.0626 0.1575* 0.105 0.118 0.0635 0.103 0.1754* 1      
10. Emotional trustb -0.0680 -0.00610 0.1332* 0.00480 0.113 0.00760 -0.00530 0.0415 0.0941 1     
11. Knowledge trustb 0.0753 -0.107 0.2396* 0.1609* -0.00730 0.00830 0.0292 0.0699 0.1837* 0.3230* 1    
12. Approachabilityb -0.0267 0.0263 -0.0751 -0.1220* 0.0490 0.0107 -0.00780 0.0901 -0.0571 0.4515* -0.1737* 1   
13. Personal sharingb 0.0228 0.0240 0.0963 -0.0152 0.0688 0.00180 0.0239 0.1237* -0.00690 0.6364* 0.1940* 0.4596* 1  
14. Location (1 = located in urban 
area) 
-0.0383 0.0733 -0.1866* -0.0803 -0.1341* 0.1899* -0.0318 -0.0831 0.00410 0.0277 0.0843 -0.0855 -0.0969 1 
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Figure 2.1. Map of Vietnam (left) and the Phu Tho Province in Northern Vietnam (right) 
Source: http://www.phutho.gov.vn 
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual Framework of the Access of New SMEs to Bank Credit 
Source: Own illustration. 
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 Appendix 2.1. SME questionnaire 2015 
SME QUESTIONNAIRE 2015 
Survey on access to finance for new SMEs in the North of Vietnam 
 
Introduction 
I am a PhD-student from Georg-August-University of Goettingen in Germany, who are interested in all activities related to access to finance at 
the firm level. Your firm has been randomly selected to participate in a survey on access to finance for new small and medium-sized enterprises.  
We assure that all of your information will be kept confidentially, only using for research purposes. It will take roundly 30 minutes to finish the 
questionnaire. If you have any questions or comments about this survey, you may contact Mr. Pham, Duy Hung; Cell phone: (84)165.9639087 or 
email: phung@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de 
The questionnaire is composed of 5 sections that are mentioned below: 
Section 1: General characteristics of the firm  
Section 2: Financing of the firm 
Section 3: Business information of the firm 
 Page: 2 
Page: 3-4 
Page: 5 
 Section 4: Managerial competency of the 
firm 
Section 5: Networking of the firm 
Page: 6 
Page: 7-9 
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 SECTION 1: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRM 
Name of the firm: ……………………………………..…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Address: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Name of respondent: ………………………………………...       Position: ……….…………………………………………………….… 
Land phone: ……………………………      Mobile phone: ……….…………………………Email: ………………………………………….. 
A.1. What is main economic activity of the firm? (Please circle one economic activity that has largest proportion of annual turnover of fiscal year 2014) 
[1] Trade   [2] Service  [3] Manufacturing   [4] Other (specify)……………………….. 
A.2. What is currently the most pressing problem the firm is facing? 
[1] Finding customers  [2] Competition [3] Access to finance  [4] Cost of production [5] Cost of labour [6] Availability of skilled staff [7] 
Experienced managers [8] Regulation [9] other (specify) 
A.3. Did the firm begin business before formally registering? [1] Yes [2] No 
 Month(mm) Year(yyyy) 
The firm began operations   
The firm formally registered   
A.4. How many employees did the firm employ in the fiscal year 2014?....................................... 
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 SECTION 2: FINANCING OF THE FIRM 
B.1. Did the firm apply any loan or line of credit from a bank or a financial institution? [1] Yes [2] No, go to BN.1 
 a) Did the firm get all of the financing requested? [1] Yes [2] No 
 b) If the firm did not get all of the financing requested, what was the main reason? 
[1] The application was rejected [2] Refused because too high interest rates [3] Refused because insufficient size of loan [4] Refused 
because insufficient maturity of loan [5] Other (specify)………….. 
BN.1. What was the main reason why the firm did not apply any line of credit or loan from a bank or a financial institution? 
[1] No need for a loan - firm has sufficient internal funds [2] Application procedures for loans or lines of credit are complex [3] Interest rates 
are not favorable [4] Collateral requirements are too high  
[5] Size of loan is insufficient [6] Maturity of loan is insufficient [7] Do not think it would be approved [8] Other 
(specify)……………… 
B.2. Please estimate the use of the following financial sources in 2014? 
Sources Value (1 million VND) 
Owner’s capital  
Bank loans  
Trade credit  
Loans from families  
Loans from friends  
Others (specify)  
Total  
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B.2.1. If the firm has a bank loan, please fill out following information about the bank loan. 
Which bank did the firm 
apply the loan? 
What was the 
amount of loan 
the firm 
applied? 
(1 million 
VND) 
What was the 
amount of loan at 
the time of 
approval? 
(1 million VND) 
How long 
did you 
wait for the 
loan? 
(days) 
Maturity 
of the loan 
(months) 
Collateral 
Interest rate 
Unit: [1] Per 
month [2] Per 
year 
What was 
the main 
reason for 
applying 
the loan? 
(Code B) 
Value 
(1 million 
VND) 
Types 
(Code 
A) 
% Unit 
          
          
          
Code A:  
[1] Land, buildings under ownership of the firm  [2] Machinery and equipment including movables [3] Accounts receivable [4] Inventories [5] Personal assets of 
owners [6] other (specify) 
Code B: 
[1] Working capital [2] Land  [3] Buildings [4] Equipment [5] Vehicles [6] Research and development or intellectual property [7] 
Promotion [8] Staff training [9] Buying another business  [10] other (specify)  
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 SECTION 3: BUSINESS INFORMATION OF THE FIRM 
C.1. Could you please tell me whether the firm had its financial statements of following fiscal years checked and certified by an external auditor, 
and what main reason for auditing? 
 2014 2013 
 Did the firm have financial 
statement audited? 
[1] Yes  [2] No, go to the 
previous year 
What was main reason for 
auditing financial statement? 
(Code C) 
Did the firm have 
financial statement 
audited? 
[1] Yes  [2] No, go to the 
previous year 
What was main reason for 
auditing financial 
statement? 
(Code C) 
Financial statement     
Code C: [1] It is necessary (required by authorities) [2] Required by banks [3] Required by shareholders [4] Other (specify)  
C.2. Did the firm have any bad credit record? [1] Yes [2] No 
C.3. In fiscal year 2014, did the firm have a written business plan? [1] Yes [2] No, go to D.1 
C.4. Is the business plan produced by an accountant/ or consultant? [1] Produced by an accountant [2] Produced by a consultant [3] Neither 
by an accountant/ or consultant 
C.5. How would you evaluate the business plan in following statements? Please circle the one that fits. 
 Very 
bad 
   Very 
good 
 Very 
bad 
   Very 
good 
1. Business plan is good and feasible 1 2 3 4 5 6. Analyzing critical risks is good 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Marketing plan is good 1 2 3 4 5 7. Having a good future growth 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Financial plan is feasible 1 2 3 4 5 8. Contingency plan is good 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Cash flow shows that credit can be repaid 1 2 3 4 5 9. The firm has suitable business premises 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Manufacturing plan is feasible 1 2 3 4 5 10. High competition 1 2 3 4 5 
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 SECTION 4: MANAGERIAL COMPETENCY OF THE FIRM 
D.1. Please fill information of the highest firm manager. 
D.1.1. Personal information 
Full name Position Age (in year) 
Gender 
[1] male 
[2] female 
Marital status 
[1] Not married [2] Married [3] 
Widow/widower 
[4] Divorced[5] Separated[6] I don’t 
know 
     
D.1.2. Education and experience information 
Education Experience 
Years of 
schooling 
(years) 
Highest 
level of 
education 
Code D 
Did the member 
participate any 
management 
course? 
[1] Yes [2] No 
Did the member 
participate any 
financial course? 
[1] Yes [2] No 
Did the member 
participate any 
taxation course? 
[1] Yes [2] No 
General 
working 
experience 
(years) 
Management/ Entrepreneurial 
experience Other 
(specify) Years Positions Code E Organization 
          
Code D: [1] Illiteracy [2] Primary [3] Secondary [4] High school [5] Vocational training [6] College/ University [7] Graduate degree 
Code E: [1] Chairman of management board/ Chairman of member council  [2] General Director [3] Chief accountant [4] Other 
(specify)………………. 
D.2. How would you evaluate the knowledge and skills of the highest manager? Please circle the one that fits. 
Knowledge Very 
bad 
   Very 
good 
Skills Very 
bad 
   Very 
good 
Knowledge of the firm’s industry 1 2 3 4 5 Managerial skills 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of finance 1 2 3 4 5 Analytical skills 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of marketing 1 2 3 4 5 Creativity 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of human resource management 1 2 3 4 5 Risk-taking 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of enterprise law, tax law 1 2 3 4 5 Innovation 1 2 3 4 5 
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 SECTION 5: NETWORKING OF THE FIRM 
E.1. In each of the following statements of the relationships between you and the bank’s credit official(s) who directly work with you. 
Please circle the one that is more demonstrative of relationships with your firm’s bank credit official. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
The bank official(s) is available to help in a crisis 1 2 3 4 5 
You are confident in the advice from your bank official(s) 1 2 3 4 5 
You are confident that bank official understand your business 1 2 3 4 5 
The bank official(s) often come forward with positive suggestions to help your business 1 2 3 4 5 
You rely on the bank official(s) to find ways of meeting business’s changing financial needs 1 2 3 4 5 
You learn about the bank credit official(s) (background, personal life, habits, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 
You attend their important personal life events (e.g., wedding or funeral of their family’s 
member) 
1 2 3 4 5 
When appropriate, you give this bank official(s) some gifts 1 2 3 4 5 
You get together with them on some holiday occasions 1 2 3 4 5 
You share with these bank credit official(s) some of your own personal information (e.g., 
background, personal life) 
1 2 3 4 5 
You feel free to share with bank credit official(s) your ideas, feelings, hopes, or problems that 
may not directly relate to business 
1 2 3 4 5 
You prefer to avoid contact with bank officials 1 2 3 4 5 
The bank officials not interested in your business 1 2 3 4 5 
You feel intimidated when dealing with bank 1 2 3 4 5 
It is important to provide your bank officials with timely and regularly management information 1 2 3 4 5 
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 E.2. In the following questions, please circle the number that best describing the extent to which top managers at your firm have 
utilized personal connections during the past 3 years for your business. 
 Very 
little Little Average Extensive 
Very 
extensive 
Your relationship with top managers of buyer firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Your relationship with top managers of supplier firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Your relationship with top managers of competitor firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Your relationship with political leader in various levels of government 1 2 3 4 5 
Your relationship with officials in Department of commerce and industry 1 2 3 4 5 
Your relationship with officials in regulatory and supporting organizations such as tax 
bureau, state banks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Your relationship with universities/ institutions 1 2 3 4 5 
E.3. Did the firm participate in any association/ organization in fiscal year 2014? [1] Yes  [2] No, go to E.4 
a) How many associations/ organizations did the firm participate in? ……………… 
b) Please answer the following questions about participating in the association/ organization. 
associations/ 
organizations 
Duration of 
membership? 
(years) 
Used 
services 
from the 
association? 
[1] Yes [2] 
No 
Got advice 
from the 
associations’ 
leaders? 
[1] Yes [2] 
No 
Did the 
association 
help the 
firm to get 
credits? 
[1] Yes [2] 
No 
If the association does not 
directly benefit your firm, 
but has benefits other 
members, you would 
contribute labour and 
money to the association? 
[1] Yes [2] No 
The 
association 
always 
treat the 
firm fairly? 
[1] Yes [2] 
No 
In general, do 
you believe 
information 
received from 
the association? 
[1] Yes [2] No 
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 E.4. Please fill information about networking of the firm with relatives and friends in below items over the fiscal year 2014. 
Relatives and 
friends 
Borrowing money Getting advice Willing to help 
Did the firm 
borrow money 
from relatives/ 
friends? 
[1] Yes  [2] No, 
go to the next 
item 
How frequently 
did the firm 
borrow money 
from relatives/ 
friends? 
Code N 
Did the firm 
get advice from 
relatives/ 
friends? 
[1] Yes  [2] No, 
go to the next 
item 
How frequently 
did the firm get 
advice from 
relatives/ 
friends? 
Code N 
If the firm has 
struggles with debt, 
do you think your 
relatives/ friends 
will lend money? 
[1] Yes [2] No 
How many 
relatives/ 
friends are 
willing to 
lend money? 
How much do 
you think the 
firm would 
borrow from 
relatives/ 
friends? 
(1 million 
VND) 
1. Relatives        
2. Friends        
Code N: [1] Never; [2] 1-3 times; [3] 4-6 times; [4] Greater than 6 times 
Thank you very much for your information! 
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 Abstract 
Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in developing and transition 
economies. Recently, more attention has been paid to the role of networks in improving 
firm performance. By using data from the DANIDA project on SME survey with more 
than 2,500 manufacturing firms in Vietnam, we examine the relationship between 
networks and firm performance, particularly focusing on small and medium-sized 
businesses. Network data covers four dimensions of networking including within-sector-
network, across-sector-network, informal and formal creditors, and politicians and civil 
servants. Multivariate panel regressions have been applied. The results suggest that firm 
performance is positively related to the existence and the size of networks with 
individuals in a different sector and networks connecting to politicians and civil servants.  
 
Keywords: SMEs, Networks, SME Performance, Vietnam, Panel Data 
JEL Classification: L25, L60, L29 
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 3.1. Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have an important role in economic growth 
worldwide. They have been found to create jobs (Chandler, 2012; Hu & Schive, 1998; 
Neumark et al., 2011; Wit & Kok, 2014), to reduce poverty (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2005), and bring about innovation (Hemert et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2010). SMEs are the 
main drivers of economic development (Ayodeji & Balcioglu, 2010) and are also 
widespread in developed economies. SMEs make up 95% of all enterprises in the OECD 
area (OECD, 2004).  
In this paper, we will investigate SME performance in one highly sucessful developing 
country, i.e. Vietnam. The annual growth rate of the Vietnamese economy is around 6% over 
the last five years. This positive development makes Vietnam an interesting country for 
research on SMEs (World Bank, 2015). Vietnamese SMEs generated about 40% of annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014. While most large companies are state owned, SMEs 
represent the growing private sector. In order to support economic development in general, 
and SME development in particular, the government has implemented many policies such as 
an economic reform program since 1986, the Company Law and Private Enterprise Law 
(1990) which were amended to the Enterprise Law (2005).  
There is a growing body of literature on firm performance of SMEs in developing countries. 
Firm performance is measured by financial outcomes (Chadha & Sharma, 2016), sales growth 
or market growth (Swierczek & Ha, 2003), customer satisfaction (Hirons et al., 1998; 
Williams & Naumann, 2011), employee growth rate, and return on assets (ROA) (Wolff 
& Pett, 2006). It is also measured by establishing a foundation upon which future growth may 
take place (Bevan, 1999; Hudson et al., 2001; Otter et al., 2014; Swierczek & Ha, 2003; 
Wolff & Pett, 2006) and by the level of satisfaction on the part of the founders (Vivarelli 
& Audretsch, 1998). Other author considers the societal contributions of small firms as an 
indicator of their performance (Reynolds, 1987).  
Firm performance has been influenced by several factors, for instance owners’ age (Le 
& Harvie, 2010), firm size (Le & Harvie, 2010), networking (BarNir & Smith, 2002; Hoang 
& Antoncic, 2003; Huggins, 2001; Lechner et al., 2006; Watson, 2007; Watson, 2011), 
ownership (Le & Harvie, 2010), etc.  
Networking has been paid more attention in recent years for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
private SMEs face twin challenges with respect to business and ownership forms (state-
owned vis-à-vis private sector; Fogel, 2001). For example, large and state owned enterprises 
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 usually have better access to finance (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005). In this case, SME 
networking could potential mitigate these disadvantages. Secondly, private SMEs are seen 
as very high-risk partners because of the high failure rate (Le & Nguyen, 2009), and 
information asymmetries (Frame, Padhi, & Woosley, 2001). For example, customers mainly 
rely on their personal networks to get information on a firm’s credibility. Therefore, 
networks could help a firm to spread knowledge of its existence, product quality and 
credibility to related stakeholders.  
Our main objective is to examine the effects of networking on SME performance (net income, 
gross margin, growth rate based on revenue and employee, ROA and ROE). Our study 
contributes to the previous literature by using panel data. Anteceding studies are based on 
cross sectional data. They mainly focus on developed countries and one network type, while 
our study investgates multiple network types in a developing country, i.e. Vietnam. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the overview of SMEs 
development in Vietnam. Section 3 reviews the literature on networks and firm performance. 
Data collection and research methodology will be described in section 4. Then, section 5 
shows the regression results. Finally, the paper closes with a conclusion and suggests 
implications to policy-makers and SMEs’ owners in developing countries regarding the 
development of SMEs. 
3.2. Overview of SMEs Development in Vietnam 
The economic reforms in 1986 created a more liberal economic model and business 
environment for private firms in Vietnam. During the French colonial period (1884-1945), 
there existed a limited scope for private firm operations. In the period of 1954-1975, Vietnam 
was divided into two political systems: the democratic republic North and the republican 
South (with a presence of the United State in military and funding). In the North, the 
Communist Party followed a nationalized industrialization policy. In the South, private firms 
were comparatively more developed. Later, in the period between 1976 and 1980, the 
Northern economic system was transferred to the South. The nationalization of all private 
companies brought the market system to a stand still. 
Since 1986, a series of policies and economic reforms has paved the way for private firm 
development. In 1990, the Enterprise Law was first issued. However, there were a number of 
challenges for new start-ups, such as a complex legal procedure or lack of funding. To ease 
the registration process, the New Enterprise Law was implemented in 1999. The number of 
newly registered firms increased. From 2000 to 2004, about 121,000 enterprises registered, 
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 most of which were SMEs. Since 2010, the growth of SMEs has been increasing gradually 
(see figure 3.1). In 2010, there were 279 thousand enterprises, after 6 years, there was an 
increase of 198 thousand enteprises (equal to 70%). 
(Insert figure 3.1 here) 
According to Decree No. 56/2009/ND-CP (2009), SMEs are divided into three levels: micro-
sized enterprises, small-sized enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises based on the size of 
their total capital or the number of labourers annually (see table 2.7). Those enterprises have 
received support (e.g. access to credit, infrustructure, training activities) by the Vietnamese 
Government, the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), banking systems, and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO).  
However, they still face numerous constraints such as low levels of supra-regional 
competitiveness, lack of well-trained workers, weak networking, poor infrastructure and 
lack of solid supporting industries (Tran, Le, & Nguyen, 2008), which could hinder their 
development. Based on several business environment indices, it can be stated that there is a 
considerable potential in further improvements of the institutional quality. Vietnam current 
ease-of-doing-business rank is 82, and therfore comparable to China’s. Similalry, its overall 
index of economic freedom is 54.2, with particular disadvantages in the area of judicial 
effectivness and government integrity. Based on our findings, the authors recommended to 
improve the business environment as well as implementing firm-oriented policies (also see 
Hoang, 2016).  
3.3. Literature Review on Networks and Firm’s Performance 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, research on social networks has been carried out in sociology 
(BarNir & Smith, 2002; Marsden, 1990). Networks can be systems, consisting of people or 
things, in order to exchange information or develop personal or professional contacts. 
Networks play vital roles in many aspects: connecting people, transfering knowledge, 
enhancing business activities, etc. 
Networks plays a crucial role in the development of SMEs (Joel A. C. Baum et al., 2000; 
Lechner et al., 2006). It can be defined as the personal relationships of owners or managers to 
individual suppliers, customers, business associations or the government officials. There is a 
growing body of literature on effects of networks in developing and transition countries. It is 
assumed to have larger effect on access to credit, access to resource or inputs, and access to 
markets (Blackwell & Winter, 1997; Fatoki & Odeyemi, 2010; Hung D. Pham, 2017; Li et al., 
2008; O'Donnell, 2014; Petrik Runst, 2010; Watson, 2011). Firm owners rely on their 
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 networks for obtaining and exchanging information, as well as gaining social-economic 
supports. In addition, through networking firms can adopt technologies or innovations as well 
as reduce information asymmetry. 
It is also hypothesized that if firms have larger networks they are more likely to display 
increased performance (Watson, 2007). As firm owners use their personal networks to contact 
stakeholders (customers or suppliers) and get better services (e.g., access to credit or 
information of modern technologies). Through networking, firms can enlarge their production 
scale. A strong network could potentially reduce transaction costs, thereby increase revenue 
or net income. In addition, it can play a role in reducing risks in markets. Blackwell and 
Winter (1997) pointed out that networking with bank officers helps firms reducing their costs 
of capital (lower interest rate). Le et al. (2006) and Le (2013) also found a close network with 
banks help improving access to credit. The effect of networks on firm’s performance also 
depends on types of firms. For instance, Acquaah (2012) found that family owned firms and 
non-family owned firms get different benefits from network relationship with bureaucratic 
officials and politicians in Ghana. Similarly, Wu, Wu, and Rui (2012) and Li et al. (2008) also 
found political connection has a positive effect on firm value and performance in China. The 
literature on business networking is linked with the literature on development economics and 
institutional economics, since firm networking can overcome detrimental offical rules or 
power structures (Méon & Weill, 2010). 
(Insert table 3.1 here) 
Watson (2011) and Sue Birley (1985) categorized networks into 2 parts: (i) formal network 
including relationship with external accountants, banks, solicitors, industry associations, 
business consultants, tax officers; (ii) informal network such as relatives and friends, business 
contact. In the early stages of firm development, small firms’ owners mainly rely on their 
informal network to search for funds. Curran, Jarvis, Blackburn, and Black Sharon (1993) 
classified networks of small businesses with four themes: the family and kindship, co-
directors and partners, customers and the market, and investment or finance. From the 
literature, we can define that firm networks composed by the relationship with competitors, 
member of formal network organization, and personal contact of owners or managers as well 
as staffs. We paid more attention on the last four components to construct the networking 
indicators in our study. 
In the Vietnamese context, Nguyen, Alam, Perry, and Prajogo (2009) found that networks of 
SMEs heavily depend on informal relationships and cultural characteristics which somewhat 
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 influence the SMEs’ development. John Mcmillan and Christopher Woodruff (1999) 
examined the effect of trading relationship of firm in Vietnam, firms offer a larger credit to 
their partners for a longer relationship. Other studies also illustrated the role of networks in 
long-term development of firms (e.g., firm success or technical efficiency) (Santarelli & Tran, 
2013; Viet Le & Charles Harvie, 2010). 
There are several ways to quantify a firm’s networks: network size (continuous variable), 
network intensity (time spent developing and maintaining business-related contact, see (Danis 
et al., 2010), and network diversity (Carson et al., 2004). Network intensity and network 
diversity can be dummy or continuous variables. Lechner et al. (2006) found that the overall 
network size (e.g. the number of contacts across all types of networks) is less important for 
firm performance than the size of specific types of networks, i.e. the relational mix. Thus, our 
research contributes to the recent literature by examining the role of different network types 
on firm performance in Vietnam. 
3.4. Research Methodology 
3.4.1. Data collection 
The data were obtained from the long-term survey of DANIDA Project in Vietnam. The 
survey was conducted by the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), the 
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), and Department of Economics of 
University of Copenhagen. The survey was distributed by more than 2,500 
manufacturing SMEs in Vietnam. The data was collected in ten representative provinces 
and cities every two years,  including Ho Chi Minh, Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Ha Tay4, Quang 
Nam, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and Long An. For a geographic 
overview see the map in figure 3.2.  
(Insert figure 3.2 here) 
Owners or representatives of SMEs were interviewed face to face, gathering information on 
firm’s characteristics, network characteristics and firm performance. The panel dataset 
includes five survey rounds from 2007 to 2015 with a total sample size 13,070 observations. 
The number of SMEs sorted by province and year is displayed in table 3.11.  
In addition, we selected 1,173 firms have fully participated in 5 round-survey summing up to 
5,865 observations to create a pure panel dataset. In each wave of the survey, bankrupt or 
4 Ha Tay is now a part of Ha Noi since 2008  
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 over-developed enterprises (not SMEs anymore) were replaced by other enterprise in the 
same sector as well as same territory. 
(Insert table 3.2 here) 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of firms by ownership type. About 65% of firms are 
household businesses, 20.9% are limited liability companies and other types of firm 
ownership (e.g., private enterprise, cooperatives, Joint Stock Company) accounted for over 
10%. For analyzing purpose, we re-categorized in two group based on firm legal status 
(household business and other firms). It is due to the fact that household businesses in 
Vietnam have smaller sizes compared to others. Another reason to reclassify is the trend of 
growing number of household business in many rural areas in Vietnam. Moreover, household 
businesses are significantly lower performing and all other types are insignificant. 
Newman, Rand, Talbot, and Tarp (2015) used two-digit codes for manufacturing sectors to 
categorize firms. However, there are a small number of observations in several sectors, 
therefore we generate categories based on economic activities (see table 3.3). About 30% of 
all enterprises can be found in the largest sub-sector, i.e. food, beverages, and tobacco. Other 
sub-sectors are less common, for instance: wood, paper products, and painting (16.2%); basic 
metals (17.9%), furniture (6.43%), etc.  
(Insert table 3.3 here) 
3.4.2 Model Specifications and Hypotheses 
After summarizing descriptive statistics, we employ Pooled-OLS, and more importantly Panel 
Data Techniques in order to analyse the relationship between selected independent variables 
and firm performance. We run several regressions to examine the relationship between 
performance outcomes and the main variables of interest (network variables) and other 
control variables.  Yit = λ + βNetwork typeit+ σXit  + µ𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖+ εit (1) 
where Xi′ is a vector of control variables comprising firm and owner characteristics. The year 
subscript t represents 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015; ω𝑖𝑖  captures unobserved heterogenity 
and ε is the error term. Control variables (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) were measured at the firm and managerial 
levels including the log of the number of employees, firm age, year of education of owners. 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of firm ownership dummies. 
Firstly, we run pooled OLS regression to examine the relationship between variables. Later 
on, random effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE) models are employed. For RE models, the 
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 individual-specific effect (unobserved heterogeneity) is a random variable that is uncorrelated 
with the independent variables, whereas an FE specification is used when the two are 
correlated. Model choice depends on the results of a Hausman Test.  
The following network types are analyzed: network with business people in the same sector; 
network with business people in the diferent sector; network with bank officials; network with 
politicians and civil servants. For each of them we generate a dummy variable, which is equal 
to zero if the manager or owner has zero contacts, and it is equal to one if more than zero 
contacts are available. We also generate a variable which records the number of contacts in 
each network group. We replace outliers in terms of network size by mean value before 
regression since they do not affect our findings. 
Since network size was measured by asking respondent to state how many people he or she 
has regular contact with, this method does not account for other nuances of networking (e.g. 
frequency of contact or intensity, duration of acquaintance, and network density). Lechner et 
al. (2006) found that the overall network size is less important than the size of specific types 
of networks. Thus, our study contributes to this more recent strand of the literature. 
The correlation matrixes for all variables were created to explore the relationship between sets 
of variables using in the regressions. It was found that majority of the variables have both 
positive or negative correlation. For instance, number of labour force has the highest 
correlation with net income of the firm (0.49).  The correlation could also identify collinearity 
within selected variables. Moreover, we tested the relationship between each of the selected 
independent variables for multicollinearity based on variance inflation factors (VIF).  
Hypotheses:  
Expansionary performance is positively affected by: 
- H1: the existence and size of the network with business people in the same sector. 
- H2: the existence and size of the network with business people in a different sector. 
- H3: the existence and size of the network with bank officials. 
- H4: the existence and size of the network with politicians and civil servants. 
In contrast, we do not expect that the non-expansionary performance measure (gross margin) 
is positively affected by networks. 
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 Variables of Interest 
Dependent Variables 
All variables and their description can be found in table 3.4. According to Dhaliwal, 
Subramanyam, and Trezevant (1999) net income is an indicator strongly associated with the 
market value of equity and predicts future operating cash flows and income. Therefore, this 
study used net income as its first direct measure of firm performance. The second 
performance measure used in this study is gross margin (Otter et al., 2014). This is the ratio of 
gross profits over total revenue. This performance measure must be interpreted with care as it 
captures the profit weighted by total revenue. In addition, we used four other variables for 
measuring firm performance: growth rate of revenue, growth rate of the number of 
employees, ROA and ROE. We tested for normality since some dependent variables are 
continuous and we control for outliers before running regressions. 
While an increases in net income, the total employee growth rate, revenue growth, ROA and 
ROE represents an expansionary measure of success (increasing size and market share), the 
sixth measure, gross margin, is a measure of success related to companies close to the 
technological frontier.  A company may increase sales by lowering prices, thereby expanding 
their market share. This strategy is to be expected in countries whose comparative advantage 
relates to low price production (extensive economic growth). The expansionary strategy can 
lead to revenue growth, a higher number of employees, and increased net income. However, 
an expansionary company may experience a growing total profit and a shrinking gross margin 
at the same time as per unit profits fall. In contrast, a high-tech company may not want to 
actively pursue a low prices/high sales strategy. Instead they may want to focus on the ratio of 
total profits to total revenue. Companies that focus on research and development are more 
likely to keep prices high and build up a reputation for innovative products instead. Overall, 
we expect expansionary measures of success to be more relevant to our research setting of 
small and medium sized companies in a developing country.    
Independent Variables 
Network variables were measured by asking respondents about the number of people that they 
currently have regular contact.  
- How many businesses people in the same sector they regular talk to and share information 
with? (Within-sector-network) 
- How many businesses people in a different sector they regular talk to and share information 
with? (Across-sector-network) 
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 - How many bank officials (both formal and informal creditors) they have a close contact? 
- How many politicians and civil servants they have a close contact? 
Control Variables 
We also control for age of company, the number of emplyoees, whether the company has easy 
access to rail, survey year, ownership type, economic sector and education level of firm owner 
(see table 3.4).  
(Insert table 3.4 here) 
3.5. Results and Discussion 
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
We divided the sample into two groups according to firm ownership (household businesses 
and other type of firms) as mention before.  Overall, houshold businesses are worse off than 
other company types (e.g., private enterprise, cooperative/partnership, limited liability 
companies, join stock company, and local state enterprise), both in terms of net income, 
network size, education level, and access to infrustructure. Most strikingly, household 
companies have a smaller likelihood of being connected to a source of finance and a politician 
or bureaucrat. The network size is lower for household businesses across all four types of 
networks. However, household businesses have slightly better performance outcomes such as 
gross margin, growth rate of revenue, growth rate of employee, ROA and ROE.  
In regard to socio-economic characteristics, household businesses are older than other firms 
(16.3 and 11.4 yearolds), also the size of firms are much smaller (5.7 and 34.4 labourers).  
(Insert table 3.5 here). 
Table 3.6 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in the regression models from 
2007 to 2015.  
Net income is the excess of revenues over expense of a firm that is commonly used as a 
measurement of performance. On average, the net income of an individual firm was VND5 
137,172,000 (USD 6,235; lnnet = 11.83). The values of other outcome variables in total 
sample were: gross margin (0.21), growth rate of revenue (0.43) and growth rate of employee 
(0.019), ROA (0.30), and ROE (0.30). These descriptive results show that firms experience 
increasing net incomes between 2007 and 2015 and mostly stagnant gross margins. 
Meanwhile, total revenue and the number of employees increase slowly. 
5 USD 1 = VND 22,000 at the time of the survey 2015 
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 On average, a firm keeps in touch with 5.5 business people in the same sector and a larger 
network of business people in different sectors with an average of 16.2. Meanwhile, the 
number of regular contacts for bank officials as well as politicians and civil servants is rather 
limited with 1 and 1.1 respectively. In the five-year period, we can see that the average size of 
the four types of networks varies little. 
Regarding firms and owners’ characteristics, we measured the highest professional 
educational completed of respondents using dummy variables. On average, the number of 
employees in a firm is about 16 and the mean age of firms is about 14.5 years. 
Regarding access to infrastructure, about 53.3% of all firms can easily access railways. In the 
period of 2007-2015, we observe an improving access to rail. Using dummies to measure the 
level of access to transport infrastructure, we expect the variable to have a positive influence 
on firm performance. 
(Insert table 3.6 here) 
3.5.2. Regression Results 
We illustrate the regression results for our dummy network variables together with the 
continuous network variables are displayed in table 3.7 and table 3.8. The network-dummy 
specifications (see table 3.7) shed light on the performance effects of the existence of a 
network. In other words, does the existence of at least one contact in each type of network 
affect outcomes? On the other hand, the continuous network variables (see table 3.8) captures 
the effects of network size on performance instead.  
Each column investigates the performance determinants for one of our six outcome variables 
described above (log of net income, gross margin, growth in revenues, employee growth, 
ROA, and ROE). Based on Hausman Tests (Chi(2)) we select a fixed effects (FE) model for 
all regressions. 
(Insert table 3.7 here) 
In table 3.7, the coefficient for the dummy “within-sector-network” displays a positive and 
statistically significant effect on growth of employee and negative effect on net income and 
gross margin. Having a within-sector-network increases the growth rate of employees by 
5.7% but lowers log inncome by 6%. Lechner et al. (2006) found that relationships with direct 
competitors have a significantly positive influence on firm development. In contrast, our 
results are mixed, and therefore inconclusive.  
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 On the other hand, having a connection with business people in a different sector exerts a 
positive and significant effect on firm performance, for instance net income increases by 
almost 12.3 percentage points and the ROA and ROE increase by almost 8.7 and 11 
percentage points repectively.  
If there is a at least one connection with a bank official, growth of revenue increases by 8.4 
percentage points. Theoretically, a relationship with banks may help enterprises to obtain 
credit. This finding is similar to earlier research showing that the relationship with banks 
increases the likelihood to access credit (Blackwell & Winter, 1997; Hung D. Pham, 2017; 
Le, 2013; Le et al., 2006).  
The existence of a political network increases net income by 4 percentage points, growth rate 
of revenue by 11.6%, and growth of employee by 2.7%. This result is in line with previous 
studies (Li et al., 2008b; Wu & Chen, 2012) 
However, the existence of three out of four network types has a negative impact on gross 
margin. The existence of a within-sector-network reduces gross margin by 1.2 percentage 
points. The existence of a bank-official-network lowers it by 1.4 percentage points, and the 
existence of a political network lowers it by nearly 0.9 percentage point. As we have stated 
above, gross margin is the only variable which does not belong to the category of an 
expansionary firm strategy (extensive growth), where prices fall and output increases. Instead, 
the gross margin relates to intensive growth driven by technological advances, which is 
arguably not the case for most of our sample.  
Overall, the results in table 3.7 lend solid support to hypotheses H2 and H4, while 
there is some support for H3. Based on the findings we can acknowledge the important 
role of political networks and networks with people in a different sector in improving 
firm performance.  
Moreover, we found some control variables such as firm age, total labour force of 
enterprise, firm ownership, firm sector and professional education level significantly 
influenceing firm performance. 
Furthermore, we also run regression in which network size is used as our main variable of 
interest (table 3.8). Overall, the size of the across-sector-network and the size of the political 
network have a positive and significant impact on expansionary firm performance. If the size 
of an across-sector-network increases by one unit, net income increases by 0.24 percentage 
points, employee growth increases by 0.12 percentage points. If the size of a political network 
increases by one unit, net income increases by 3.2 percentage points and revenue growth 
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 increases by 5.3 percentage points. Thus, the quantitative impact of political network size is 
larger than the quantitative impact of the across-network size. Overall, our results are very 
similar with the regression using dummy variables, lending support to hypothesis H2 and H4. 
(Insert table 3.8 here) 
3.5.3. Testing for Multicollinearity 
As mentioned earlier, we tested for multicollinearity using VIF before running all 
regressisons. As showed in table 3.9 & 3.10, VIFs range from 1.04 to 1.36 that are below 
threshold of 10 (Hair, Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998). There are no biased by the 
presence of severe multicollinearity in any regression.  
(Insert table 3.9 here) 
(Insert table 3.10 here) 
3.6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The paper analyzed factors influencing firms’ peformance using the unbalanced panel dataset 
from the survey in Vietnam with a sample of more than 2,500 firms. SMEs are very important 
for long-term development of the developing countries, particularly in Vietnam. In most 
country, firms play a role as a main diver of growth rate and sustainability. For development 
of SMEs, networks play a crucial role in their business, especially to get information from 
their partners and from the market in order to make a right decision. Firms have several types 
of networks, for instance: network with business people in the same sector, in a different 
sector, network with customers, or network with bank or societies. However, not every 
network type has the same effect on firm performance. Also, the existence and size of each 
type of network depends on the owners or managers’ strategy. Many firms strive to diversify 
their networks not only with other business people but also politicians and credit officers, 
meanwhile others only invested in specific network. 
We contribute new insights to our understanding of the factors influencing SME performance 
(e.g. net income, gross margin, growth rate of revenue, growth rate of employee, ROA and 
ROE) in developing countries by using panel data from Vietnam. We focus on the role of 
different types of networks. We find that the four types of networks have different effect on 
firm performance measurement. It also depends on the Vietnamese context where SMEs are 
paying more attention on building their networks in order to improve firm’s performance. 
Other control variables (firm age, total labour force of enterprise, firm ownership, firm sector 
and professional education level) significantly influence firm performance. These results are 
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 in line with the previous studies on the role of networks (Acquaah, 2012; Le & Nguyen, 2009; 
Lechner et al., 2006; Watson, 2007). One of the most interesting findings is the role of 
network with politicians or civil servants in improving firm performance, that is similar to the 
results from studies by Wu et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2008). 
In order to improve performance, firm owners invest in building their networks. Firm 
owners reduce price for their close partners. On the one hand, it might lead to a lower 
profit per unit. In this manner, the enterprise most likely sells more products, resulting in 
higher total profits. Relatively more successful owners build up the relationship with at 
least one firm in the same sector, and at least one bank. In addition, relatively more 
successful firms build up relationships with people in a different manufacturing sector as 
well as with politicians/civil servants.  
Further research should aim at measuring networks in more detail, for instance, the diversity 
of networks or network ties. It is important to know how firm owners use their networks to 
exchange information such as frequency and importance of the exchanged information within 
the networks and its effect on firm performance. 
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 Table 3.1. Benefits of SME-Networks 
Network Type Potential Benefits Literature 
General, Multiple 
 
Multiple Watson (2007); O'Donnell 
(2014);  
Lechner et al. (2006); 
Santarelli and Tran (2013); 
Petrik Runst (2010); 
Nguyen et al. (2009); 
Within-Sector-Networks Production Cooperation  
 
Lechner et al. (2006); Joel A. 
C. Baum et al. (2000);  
 
Across-Sector and 
Customer Networks 
Input Procurement, Sales of 
Intermediate or Final 
Products, Informal Credits 
through Customer 
Relationships  
 
Petrik Runst (2010); 
Mcmillan and Woodruff 
(1999);  
Lechner et al. (2006) 
Bank Officials Access to Finance, Reduces 
Interest Rates (Overcoming 
Asymmetric Information 
Problems) 
 
Le et al. (2006); Le (2013); 
Blackwell and Winter 
(1997); 
Lechner et al. (2006); 
Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010); 
Hung D. Pham (2017) 
 
Bureaucrats and Politicians Circumventing official rules; 
Gaining Information 
 
Acquaah (2012); Petrik 
Runst (2010);  
Méon and Weill (2010); 
Li et al. (2008); Wu et al. 
(2012) 
 
Other Gender effects 
 
Watson (2011) 
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 Table 3.2. Category SMEs Based on Ownership (Pooled Sample) 
Order Firm ownership Absolute number Percent Cum. 
1 Household business 8,442 64.59 64.59 
2 Private enterprise 1,002 7.67 72.26 
3 Cooperative/Partnership 376 2.88 75.13 
4 Limited liability companies 2,731 20.90 96.03 
5 Joint stock company 515 3.94 99.97 
6 Local state enterprise 4 0.03 100.00 
  Total 13,070      
Source: DANIDA survey, authors’ calculation 
Table 3.3. Category SMEs Based on Manufacturing Sector (Pooled Sample) 
Order Firm sector Absolute number Percent Cum. 
1 Manufacture of food, beverages, tobacco products 3,845 29.42 29.42 
2 Manufacture of wood, paper products, and printing 2,112 16.16 45.58 
3 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum, 
chemical, rubber, plastics, and other non-metallic 
mineral products 
1,579 12.08 57.66 
4 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal 
products 2,341 17.91 75.57 
5 Manufacture of furniture 840 6.43 82.00 
6 Manufacture of other products 2,061 15.77 97.77 
7 Others 292 2.23 100.00 
  Total 13,070     
Source: DANIDA survey, own calculation 
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 Table 3.4. Variables, Measures and Expected Sign of Influence on Firm Performance 
 Variables Measures Expected signs 
1 Dependent variables  
 lnnet Natural logarithm of net profit  
 gross_margin Gross profit / Revenue  
 growth_revenue (Revenuet- Revenuet−1) / Revenuet−1  
 growth_emp (Employeet- Employeet−1) / Employeet−1  
 ROA Return / total assets  
 ROE Return / total equity capital  
    
2 Main independent variables  
 d_same_sector Dummy network with business people in the same 
sector + 
 d_diferent_sector Dummy network with business people in a 
different sector + 
 d_bank_officials Dummy network with bank officials + 
 d_politicians Dummy network with politicians and civil servants + 
    
 net_same_sector Network size with business people in the same 
sector + 
 net_diferent_sector Network size with business people in a different 
sector + 
 net_bank_officials Network size with bank officials + 
 net_politicians Network size with politicians and civil servants + 
    
3 Control variables  
 firmage Age of firm in years  
 employees Total labour force of enterprise  
 access_rail Easy access to rail  
 year of survey Year of survey (2007; 2009; 2011; 2013 and 2015)  
 firm ownership Firm ownership (household business; private 
enterprise; cooperative/ partnership; limited 
liability companies; joint stock company; local 
state enterprise) 
 
 firm sector Economic sector of firm (see table 3)  
 owner education Education level of owner (no_certificate; 
vocational; advanced_vocational; college degree; 
university degree) 
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 Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics from Pooled Sample (by firm ownership) 
Variables Other firms Household business Differences 
lnnet 12.813 11.285 1.53*** 
gross_margin 0.171 0.235 -0.06*** 
growth_revenue 0.404 0.445 -0.04* 
growth_emp 0.001 0.028 -0.03** 
ROA 0.220 0.339 -0.12*** 
ROE 0.227 0.345 -0.12*** 
    
d_same_sector 0.929 0.898 0.03*** 
d_diferent_sector 0.970 0.970 0.00 
d_bank_officials 0.643 0.425 0.22*** 
d_politicians 0.715 0.562 0.15*** 
net_same_sector 6.456 4.998 1.46*** 
net_diferent_sector 17.786 15.267 2.52*** 
net_bank_officials 1.472 0.784 0.69*** 
net_politicians 1.375 0.970 0.40*** 
    
firmage 11.351 16.286 -4.93*** 
employees 34.445 5.739 28.71*** 
access_rail 0.645 0.472 0.17*** 
    
N 4,628 8,442  
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.6. Descriptive Statistics from Pooled Sample 
Variables Full sample 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Min Max Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent variables            
lnnet 8.0 16.9 11.826 1.396 11.357 1.408 11.703 1.431 11.958 1.369 12.049 1.316 12.073 1.318 
gross_margin -0.2 1.0 0.212 0.119 0.224 0.136 0.205 0.110 0.216 0.123 0.207 0.098 0.207 0.123 
growth_revenue -1.0 5.0 0.431 1.034 . . 0.680 1.200 0.499 1.060 0.257 0.930 0.294 0.859 
growth_emp -1.0 2.0 0.019 0.502 . . 0.026 0.518 0.009 0.515 -0.004 0.493 0.044 0.481 
ROA -4.8 3.0 0.297 0.433 0.314 0.453 0.315 0.421 0.277 0.420 0.280 0.447 0.298 0.421 
ROE -2.0 3.0 0.303 0.478 0.307 0.500 0.323 0.499 0.280 0.458 0.289 0.472 0.316 0.459 
               
Independent variables            
d_same_sector 0.0 1.0 0.909 0.287 0.857 0.351 0.948 0.223 0.928 0.259 0.925 0.263 0.890 0.313 
d_diferent_sector 0.0 1.0 0.970 0.171 0.939 0.240 0.923 0.266 0.998 0.044 0.996 0.062 0.995 0.073 
d_bank_officials 0.0 1.0 0.502 0.500 0.465 0.499 0.571 0.495 0.451 0.498 0.534 0.499 0.489 0.500 
d_politicians 0.0 1.0 0.616 0.486 0.553 0.497 0.635 0.481 0.550 0.498 0.666 0.472 0.676 0.468 
net_same_sector 0.0 29.0 5.514 5.159 5.309 5.244 6.251 5.655 4.897 4.421 5.781 5.234 5.313 5.038 
net_diferent_sector 0.0 69.0 16.159 12.084 14.540 12.245 14.545 11.861 15.946 11.401 17.732 11.513 18.065 12.843 
net_bank_officials 0.0 6.0 1.029 1.341 0.901 1.233 1.173 1.378 0.893 1.265 1.143 1.425 1.030 1.368 
net_politicians 0.0 4.0 1.114 1.099 1.009 1.113 1.203 1.147 0.976 1.067 1.175 1.068 1.203 1.073 
               
Control variables            
firmage 2.0 59.0 14.538 10.021 13.312 10.227 14.509 11.340 13.350 9.280 15.538 9.862 15.961 8.899 
employees 1.0 300.0 15.903 30.077 17.137 31.456 17.004 29.690 15.758 29.649 14.724 28.685 14.853 30.719 
access_rail 0.0 1.0 0.533 0.499 0.377 0.485 0.579 0.494 0.512 0.500 0.577 0.494 0.621 0.485 
               
N 13,070 2,635 2,659 2,552 2,575 2,649 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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 Table 3.7. Effects of Availability of Network Types on Firm Performance 
VARIABLES FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE 5 FE 6 lnnet gross_margin growth_revenue growth_emp ROA ROE 
       
Dummy network with business people in the same sector -0.05942* -0.01165*** 0.04092 0.05721** -0.01351 -0.01457 
 (0.03273) (0.00425) (0.05662) (0.02841) (0.01633) (0.01812) 
Dummy network with business people in a different sector 0.12294** 0.00329 -0.08421 -0.07659 0.08726*** 0.11054*** 
 (0.05911) (0.01074) (0.11748) (0.05437) (0.03286) (0.02748) 
Dummy network with bank officials 0.01076 -0.01440*** 0.08484** 0.02179 -0.01260 -0.01642 
 (0.02106) (0.00262) (0.03753) (0.01791) (0.00979) (0.01089) 
Dummy network with politicians and civil servant 0.04127** -0.00927*** 0.11556*** 0.02735* -0.00791 0.00323 
 (0.02045) (0.00248) (0.03508) (0.01640) (0.00900) (0.01000) 
       
Firm age (in years) -0.00037 -0.00051** 0.00771** 0.00118 -0.00010 -0.00071 
 (0.00159) (0.00025) (0.00336) (0.00148) (0.00068) (0.00077) 
Total labour force of enterprise 0.00833*** 0.00002 0.00697*** 0.00711*** 0.00080*** 0.00045 
 (0.00116) (0.00007) (0.00135) (0.00089) (0.00028) (0.00032) 
Easy access to rail -0.03146 -0.01220*** 0.05943 -0.02249 0.00564 -0.00071 
 (0.02263) (0.00271) (0.04188) (0.02051) (0.00988) (0.01160) 
       
Year of survey yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm ownership yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm sector yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Owner education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Constant 10.96672*** 0.24699*** 0.30258 -0.12703 0.25765*** 0.23919*** 
 (0.12884) (0.01638) (0.20843) (0.11038) (0.06365) (0.05254) 
Observations 12,979 12,980 8,379 8,379 12,980 12,980 
R-squared 0.11455 0.02182 0.04858 0.04340 0.01712 0.01173 
Hausman test (Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of firm_ID 4,602 4,602 3,278 3,278 4,602 4,602 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 3.8. Effects of Network Size Variables on Firm Performance 
VARIABLES FE 7 FE 8 FE 9 FE 10 FE 11 FE 12 lnnet gross_margin growth_revenue growth_emp ROA ROE 
       
Networksize with business people in the same sector -0.00005 0.00035 0.00089 0.00230 -0.00195*** -0.00088 
 (0.00195) (0.00024) (0.00329) (0.00160) (0.00075) (0.00092) 
Networksize with business people in a different sector 0.00239*** -0.00018* 0.00123 0.00117* 0.00043 0.00044 
 (0.00083) (0.00009) (0.00136) (0.00066) (0.00037) (0.00042) 
Networksize with bank officials -0.00539 -0.00516*** 0.02100 0.00010 -0.00288 0.00114 
 (0.00864) (0.00096) (0.01346) (0.00672) (0.00354) (0.00415) 
Networksize with politicians and civil servant 0.03162*** -0.00211* 0.05343*** 0.01054 0.00420 0.00489 
 (0.00961) (0.00111) (0.01600) (0.00739) (0.00369) (0.00436) 
       
Firm age (in years) -0.00064 -0.00051** 0.00793** 0.00139 -0.00025 -0.00095 
 (0.00158) (0.00025) (0.00331) (0.00147) (0.00067) (0.00077) 
Total labour force of enterprise 0.00831*** 0.00002 0.00702*** 0.00712*** 0.00077*** 0.00042 
 (0.00116) (0.00007) (0.00135) (0.00089) (0.00028) (0.00032) 
Easy access to rail -0.03134 -0.01239*** 0.05601 -0.02545 0.00692 0.00183 
 (0.02262) (0.00273) (0.04160) (0.02043) (0.00977) (0.01151) 
       
Year of survey yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm ownership yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm sector yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Owner education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Constant 10.99731*** 0.23694*** 0.24604 -0.17257* 0.32427*** 0.32317*** 
 (0.10839) (0.01244) (0.16676) (0.09391) (0.05219) (0.04226) 
Observations 12,979 12,980 8,379 8,379 12,980 12,980 
R-squared 0.11556 0.01906 0.04827 0.04280 0.01623 0.01006 
Hausman test (Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of firm_ID 4,602 4,602 3,278 3,278 4,602 4,602 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 3.9. Collinearity Tests (using dummies for network type) 
Variables         VIF 1/VIF 
d_same_sector 1.04 0.959 
d_diferent_sector 1.07 0.933 
d_bank_officials 1.12 0.890 
d_politicians 1.1 0.908 
   
firmage 1.16 0.860 
employees 1.36 0.734 
access_rail 1.09 0.917 
   
year of survey yes yes 
firm ownership yes yes 
firm sector yes yes 
owner education yes yes 
   
Notes: Controlled for year of survey, firm ownership and firm sector; VIF, Variance inflation; 
1/VIF, Tolerance. 
 
 
Table 3.10. Collinearity Tests (using network size) 
Variables         VIF 1/VIF 
net_same_sector 1.06 0.941 
net_diferent_sector 1.08 0.930 
net_bank_officials 1.18 0.848 
net_politicians 1.12 0.891 
   
firmage 1.15 0.870 
employees 1.37 0.731 
access_rail 1.08 0.925 
   
year of survey yes yes 
firm ownership yes yes 
firm sector yes yes 
owner education yes yes 
   
Notes: Controlled for year of survey, firm ownership and firm sector; VIF, Variance inflation; 
1/VIF, Tolerance. 
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 Table 3.11. Number of SMEs Surveyed 2007-2015 
Province/City 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
Ha Noi 279 279 270 285 296 
Phu Tho 242 257 252 259 254 
Ha Tay 381 371 340 347 371 
Hai Phong 194 208 205 190 219 
Nghe An 349 352 349 347 340 
Quang Nam 154 151 158 167 171 
Khanh Hoa 86 93 97 90 99 
Lam Dong 81 67 78 88 92 
Ho Chi Minh 602 603 574 622 653 
Long An 124 127 126 136 133 
Total 2,492 2,508 2,449 2,531 2,628 
Source: CIEM and DANIDA surveys, 2007-2015 
Note: The overall number of provinces is 63 
84 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3.1. The Development of Enterprise in Vietnam (GSO, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Map of Vietnam (left) and the Surveyed Provinces (right) 
Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com 
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 Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of institutions on performance of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) using five rounds of panel data collected from 1,173 SMEs in 
Vietnam from 2007-2015. Controlling for other factors, we estimate multiple linear 
regression models and find that SMEs domiciled in provinces with higher provincial 
competitiveness index (PCI) have better performance than SMEs domiciled in low 
ranked provinces. However, we get mixed effects on performance when sub-PCI indices 
are used. We recommend that the regional governments in Vietnam should reduce the 
barriers to SMEs’ entry into the market by creating a conducive business environment for 
inception and growth of SMEs. Policy reforms towards creating stronger formal institutions 
that support SME growth would be beneficial. 
 
Keywords: Formal Institutions, SME Performance, PCI, Panel Data, Vietnam.  
JEL Classification: B25, B52, D02, L25, P26 
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 4.1. Introduction 
There is extant institutional economics literature in the last two decades, especially 
about the role of institutions in spurring economic growth and development in transition 
and developing countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Murrell, 2003; Wright et al., 2005). In 
many of these countries, formal institutions are generally weak and their populations 
largely observe traditional informal institutions to conduct business. This further 
cripple’s enforcement of laws as the level of awareness of statutory laws and regulations 
is limited. Analysis of existent formal institutions and their influence on inception and 
growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is critical particularly in 
countries such as Vietnam. 
North (1989) described the role of institution and its effect on development and 
economic performance. He defined “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
Defined this way, institutions are affected and shaped by these factors: socio-economic 
factors, politico-administrative factors, as well as the structure of organizations. They 
can be classified into formal and informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999). Formal 
institutions vary across regions or countries and significantly affect organisation 
(structure), operations and performance of firms i.e. adversely negatively affect the 
activities of foreign enterprises (Li and Sun, 2017),  firms’ export strategies (Nguyen et 
al., 2013), and where or how foreign investments are set up (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). 
However, empirical studies on the role of institutional factors in enhancing growth of 
SMEs remains scarce particularly in the case of Vietnam. 
The purpose of this paper is to explain institutional factors influencing firm performance 
and derive policy implications from the results. Due to the limitations of survey data, we 
mainly focus on the effects of formal institutions (e.g., political institutions, laws, legal 
systems, or regulations) on SMEs’ performance and hypothesize that specific institutional 
factors significantly affect SMEs’ performance (in terms of net income, return on assets 
- ROA, return on equity - ROE, gross margin, growth of revenue, employees, and 
assets). To test the hypotheses, multiple panel regression models are fitted on five-
rounds panel data on 1,173 SMEs, collected from Danish international development 
agency (DANIDA) database in Vietnam. We contribute to the body of literature on the 
effects of institutions on SME performance in developing countries using the provincial 
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 competitiveness index (PCI)6 in the context of Vietnam. Overall, results show that formal 
institutional factors have significant positive effect on SME performance. Based on the 
findings, we recommend strengthening formal institutions to improve public services and 
business environment that accelerate SME growth. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature on 
institutions and firm performance, followed by methodology in section 3 and result and 
discussion in section 4. Section 5 entails the general conclusions and policy implications 
from the study. 
4.2. Literature Review on Role of Institution in Firm Performance  
Our overall research agenda concerns the link between a region’s institutional 
framework and the performance of its respective firms. Therefore, in the following 
discussions, we review the relevant literature on both domains. 
Regarding the measurement of firm performance, it is predominantly measured by; 
financial outcomes (Chadha and Sharma, 2016), sales growth or market growth 
(Swierczek and Ha, 2003), customer satisfaction (Hirons et al., 1998; Williams and 
Naumann, 2011), employee growth, and ROA (Wolff and Pett, 2006). It is also 
measured by established foundations for growth in the future (Bevan, 1999; Hudson et 
al., 2001; Otter et al., 2014; Swierczek and Ha, 2003; Wolff and Pett, 2006), and by the 
level of satisfaction on the part of firms’ founders (Vivarelli and Audretsch, 1998). 
Other authors consider the societal contributions (e.g. gross sales revenue, out-of-state 
or domestic exports, and job creation) of small firms as an indicator of their 
performance (e.g. Reynolds, 1987). Firm performance is affected by several other 
factors such as: owners’ age (Le and Harvie, 2010), firm size (Le and Harvie, 2010), 
networking abilities (BarNir and Smith, 2002; Huggins, 2001; Lechner et al., 2006; 
Watson, 2007; Watson, 2011), firms’ ownership (Le and Harvie, 2010), and institutions 
(Li and Sun, 2017).  
From a new institutional economics perspective, transition countries like Vietnam have 
experienced a rapid change in formal and informal institutions (e.g., statutory laws and 
regulations, social norms, culture or traditions) in recent years due to  globalization and 
modernization of business systems (Tran et al., 2009). This is also relevant in our study 
particularly on the factors influencing firm activities, structure and performance. In fact, a 
large number of SMEs lack strategies to cope with the changing business environments to 
6 For details of the PCI, we refer to: http://eng.pcivietnam.org/ 
89 
 
                                                 
 better performance and their adaptation is slower than the rapid institutional changes 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Murrell, 2003). Institutional change can contribute to long-term 
development of firms (e.g., firm growth, governance, and performance) and economy-wide 
transformation in general. Krasniqi and Desai (2017) found that good informal institutions 
improved export performance in 26 transition economies. Bardhan (2005) explained how 
institutions affect economic performance in many poor countries but the effects are mixed 
(e.g., it can negatively or positively influence performance). Li and Sun (2017) also found that 
sub-national institutions such as the government effectiveness, legal environment, and 
economic performance affect performance of foreign firms in China. Due to the changes in 
socio-economic and political institutions within the country, sub-national institutions are 
expected to affect firm performance at regional levels.  
Similarly, changes in formal institutions and regulations also significantly affect firm 
performance in Vietnam (Nguyen et al. 2017). Revenue growth of SMEs is a dependent 
variable to measure firm performance and selected independent variables such as: local 
governance quality, informal charges and transparency (two indices of PCI). Other 
control variables were applied in the regressions for instance: firm ownership, firm age, 
firm size and asset structure.  
Another study by Nguyen et al. (2013) examined sub-national institutional factors 
influencing the relationship between export strategy and firm performance. Based on the 
institutional economic theory, the authors used two main factors - State-owned 
enterprises (SOE) bias7 and local governmental transparency to test several hypotheses 
of the effect on firm performance that is measured by the pooled return on investment 
(direct effect). The study found the local governmental transparency had a positive 
effect on firm performance as well as on firms’ internationalization effort meanwhile the 
SOEs bias negatively influence firm performance. 
Murrell (2003) stated that the political changes such as movement from centralized planning  
to market oriented economy and the accompanying institutional changes can affect the 
internal organizations of firms as well as the mechanism of firm governance. The institutional 
frameworks in transition countries have significantly improved since the 1990s. The author 
differentiated these types of institutions: (i) those produced by private bodies with a formal 
role promoted or facilitated by the State; (ii) political institutions; (iii) institution-like 
behaviour by State administrative bodies; (iv) the effects of the actions of independent quasi-
7 SOEs bias means local governments (e.g., provinces, States) favor State-owned firms development. 
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 governmental bodies; (v) the legal systems. Based on this approach, Murrell (2003) concluded 
that institutions play a central role in the processes of economic development.  
In Vietnam, there has been remarkable institutional reforms since 1986 when the country 
shifted from centralized planning to market oriented economy. This paved the way for private 
firms’ development and adjustments to the changes. However, some of the changes in laws 
and regulations were rather ambiguous, resulting in misinterpretation or heterogeneous 
implementation of policies by the regional (provincial) Governments. Studies on economic 
performance in Vietnam with an institutional focus are scarce (Tran et al., 2009). Chand 
et al. (2001) provided an intensive review of the role of institutions in development and 
concluded that right institutions can lead to rapid growth, and increased productivity 
especially in the agricultural sector. Using a large sample of more than 300,000 SMEs, 
Nguyen et al. (2017) found that firm performance (growth of revenue) was positively 
influenced by the quality of local governance. In addition, the effect of institutions is 
stronger for young and small SMEs in areas where there had been less support for 
development of private enterprises. Tran et al. (2009) found that the right institutions 
have a positive effect on firm performance and that governance remains the central 
obstacle for the development of private firms in Vietnam. 
Our paper contributes to existing literature on the role of formal institutions in the 
development of SMEs in developing countries. We test the effects of various regional 
and institutional factors on firm performance using 7 performance indicators constructed 
from a balanced panel dataset. Our study is novel for two reasons. First, unlike other 
studies that only focused on one or two outcome variables (indicators) of performance, 
we include several performance indicators in the regressions. In the context of this 
study, firm performance broadly refers to operational and financial outcomes such that mixed 
effects of the relationships could be analysed more clearly. Secondly, to the best of our 
knowledge, no studies have analysed the effect of formal institutions on firm 
performance for the case of Vietnam.  
4.3. Research Methodology  
4.3.1. Data Collection 
The data were obtained from a long-term survey by the DANIDA Project in Vietnam. The 
surveys were conducted every two years by the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs 
(ILSSA), the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), and the Department of 
Economics of University of Copenhagen, among more than 2,500 manufacturing SMEs in 
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 Vietnam. The geographic coverage encompassed 10 representative provinces and cities from 
North to South of Vietnam, including Ho Chi Minh, Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Ha Tay, Quang 
Nam, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and Long An. 
(Insert figure 3.2 here) 
Face-to-face interviews with firm owners (or representatives) were conducted using semi-
structured questionnaires. The questionnaires detailed; general characteristics of firms, and 
firm owners, and firm performance. The panel dataset includes five survey rounds from 2007 
to 2015. We selected only 1,173 firms that were surveyed in all the five rounds, totalling to 
5,865 observations.  
We used the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) as a measure of institutional factors. The 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) conduct an annual business survey assessment and 
ranking of the economic governance quality of provincial authorities to help create a more 
favourable business environment. It was first introduced in 2005 and has become an important 
index for evaluating the competitiveness of each province or city. The PCI comprises ten sub-
indices, reflecting economic governance areas that affect SMEs development and also ranking 
the level of competitiveness of each province within the country. 
(Insert table 4.1 here) 
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of firms by ownership type. About 72% of firms are 
household businesses, 16% are limited liability companies and other types of firm ownership 
(e.g., private enterprise, cooperatives, Joint Stock Company) constitute 12%.  
Newman et al. (2015) used two-digit codes for manufacturing sectors to categorize firms. 
However, there is only a small number of observations for several of the sectors; therefore, we 
generated categories based on economic activities (see table 4.2). About 31% of all 
enterprises can be found in the largest sub-sectors, e.g., food, beverages, and tobacco. Other 
sub-sectors are less common, for instance: wood, paper products, painting (18%), basic metals 
(18%), furniture (8%), etc.  
(Insert table 4.2 here) 
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 4.3.2. Model Specifications and Hypotheses 
The effects of formal institutions on the firm performance of SMEs can be explained by using 
an equation in the following form: Yit = λ + β ∗ Institutional Qualityit+ σXit  + µ𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖+ εit  (1) 
 
Y: dependent variable stands for firm performance; Xi: control variables (i =1,…, n); Di: 
dummy of firms located in the three biggest cities (D = 1). 
where Xi′ is the vector of control variables comprising firm, owner characteristics, and time (t) 
or year of survey (t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) stands for 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015. 𝜔𝜔 captures 
unobserved effects and ε is the error term. 
Our main hypothesis is that formal institutions have an influence on firm performance. Based 
on literature, we formulated 10 specific hypotheses are as below: 
* Firm performance is negatively affected by: 
H1: the low entry cost for starting up a business. Our hypothesis based on the theory of the 
low entry cost to participate in markets leading to an increase number of enterprises. 
According to Klapper et al. (2006) low entry cost has a positive effect on the number of new 
firm established. We therefore expect that, once the level of competitiveness firm increases, 
this will negatively influence firm performance. 
H2: the proactive and creative provincial leadership in solving problems for enterprises. This 
type of leadership leads to an increase in the number of firms established; therefore, the level 
of competitiveness no the market will increase. That way, active leadership, while desirable 
from an economic policy perspective, can negatively affect firm performance in the short-run. 
* Firm performance is positively affected by: 
H3: the easy access to land and the security of business premises (the ability of 
government for protecting all aspects of businesses to minimize the risks). Our 
assumption is that the easier access to land use right reduces renting cost for firms. In 
Vietnam, Carlier and Tran (2004) found that private firms incur transaction costs by 
visiting many government agencies, paying a large amount of informal fees and waiting 
up to 2 years for a land use right certificate.  
H4: the overall transparency of the business environment. From literature can acknowledged 
that business transparency helps firms fully access related information regarding their 
business sector. Based upon this information, firm owners propose and implement relevant 
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 policies or strategies. For instance, the government plans to implement a financial support 
program for firm in the agricultural sector. If the information is transparent, all firms in the 
sector can prepare all required conditions in order to access to the financial support program. 
As a result, firm can reduce financial cost, which in turn will improve firm performance. 
According to Nguyen et al. (2013) provincial transparency had a positive significant with firm 
performance and export strategy in Vietnam. 
H5: the limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and inspections. If firms reduce 
time to solve administrative processes such as tax application or submitting reports, firms will 
invest more time in doing business activities. In addition, a reduction in time for solving 
administrations work can lead to a decrease of labour costs. Li and Sun (2017) found that the 
limited time spent on bureaucratic interactions has a positive effect on performance of foreign 
firms in China.  
H6: the informal charges. A decrease of informal charges (e.g., corruption) reduces time 
firms spend on building networks with local authorities, thereby reducing unnecessary 
costs and avoiding any troubles from local authorities. In China, Li and Sun (2017) found 
that the low taxes and fees have a positive effect on performance of foreign firms. 
Similarly, Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) found that high corruption has a significant 
negative effect on firm growth in Vietnam.  
H7: the limited crowding out private activity from policy biases toward State-owned firms. 
Theoretically, the fairness in dealing with firms, whether private, State-owned or foreign 
enterprises creates a good business environment for all, by enabling easy access to input and 
output markets. Nguyen et al. (2013) found that the biases for State-owned enterprises have a 
negative effect on performance of private firms in Vietnam.  
H8: the development of high-quality business support services. According to the international 
monetary fund - IMF (2000) Vietnam lacks transparency and a service sector to effectively 
support business development. In theory, the quality of public and private directly impacts 
firm performance in certain areas. A poor service causes the wastes of time and money of 
firms. For instance, if the tax bureaus do not fully support (due to the lack of specialization) 
firms, they have to spend more time on applying reports, thus increasing costs. Another 
example is that the poor transportation services taking more time to transfer products from 
producers to end-consumers resulting a low quality.  
H9: the quality of labour training policies. Theoretically, the quality of labour forces increases 
the quality of products using certain technologies. In addition, firms can reduce costs for re-
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 training labours (e.g., training course, practical training costs) if they have well-trained labour 
sources. In China, Li and Sun (2017) found that the low level of labour flexibility has a 
negative effect on performance of foreign firms. 
H10: the fair and effective legal procedures for dispute resolution. The fairness of laws plays 
an important role in the development of firms. If advocacy groups (special interest groups) 
have found guilty of corruption existing, it can be negatively influence on firm performance. 
According to Li and Sun (2017), the high level of confidence in court and property right 
protection has a positive effect on foreign firms in China. 
Variables of Interest 
Dependent Variables   
According to Dhaliwal et al. (1999) net income as an indicator of firm performance is 
strongly associated with the market value of equity and predicts future operating cash flows 
and income. Therefore, this study uses net income as its first direct measure of firm 
performance and the second one is gross margin (Otter et al., 2014). This is the ratio of 
gross profits to total revenue. This performance measure must be interpreted with care 
as it captures the profit weighted by total revenue. In addition, we used five other 
variables for measuring firm performance: growth rate of revenue, growth rate of the 
number of employees, growth of assets, ROA and ROE. In our model, net income, ROA, 
ROE, and gross margin are variables represent for short-run effects since those variables 
explain firm performance in a given year. Meanwhile, the variables: growth of revenue, 
growth of employees and growth of assets represent long-run effects. The reason is that 
those variables measure the extend of firm scales as well as the firm growth over time. 
Independent Variables 
The PCI is employed in order to measure the quality of local government services in this 
paper (PCI, 2017). The PCI is constructed in a three-step sequence: (1) collect business 
survey data and published data sources, (2) calculate ten sub-indices and standardize to a 10-
point scale, and (3) calibrate the composite PCI as the weighted mean of ten sub-indices with 
a maximum score of 100 points. The higher score, the better the quality of local government 
operations. In addition, each sub-PCI has a different effect on firm performance. Regarding 
the sampling procedure, firms were selected using random sampling to mirror provincial 
populations. Stratification is used to make sure that firm age, legal type, and sector are 
accurately represented.  
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 The first sub index considers the entry costs for SME start-up. The goal of this sub-index 
is to assess the differences in entry costs for new firms across provinces. This sub index 
comprises of several factors such as: length of business registration in days; percentage of 
firms that need additional licenses/permits; number of licenses and permits necessary to 
start operations after 2010; number of days to wait for land use right certificate, etc. The 
second sub index is the ease of access to land and security of tenure, two most critical 
land issues affecting entrepreneurs. 
The third sub index is transparent business environment and equitable access to business 
information. This is a measure of whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal 
documents which are necessary to run their businesses, whether those documents are available 
to the public, whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably 
implemented, and the business utility of the provincial webpage. It is commonly measured by 
the 5-points Likert scale. 
The fourth sub index considers the minimal informal charges that represents how much firms 
pay in informal charges, how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business 
operations, whether payment of those extra fees results in their expectation and whether 
provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to illegally extract rents. 
The fifth sub index is the limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and 
inspections. A measure of how much time firms spent on bureaucratic compliance, as well as 
how often and for how long firms must shut their operations down for inspections by local 
regulatory agencies. 
The sixth sub-index is the limit crowding out of private activity from policy biases toward 
State, foreign, or connected firms. It represents the privileges that local governments give to 
State-owned economic group, corporations, causing difficulties to businesses. 
The seventh sub-index is the proactive and creative provincial leadership in solving problems 
for enterprises. A measure of the creativity and cleverness of provinces in implementing 
central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector development, and working 
within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favour of 
local private firms and other government support. 
The eighth sub-index is the developed and high-quality business support services. This sub 
index is a measure of provincial services for private sector trade promotion, provision of 
regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of industrial zones 
or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms. 
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 The ninth sub-index is the labour training policies, which shows how provincial authorities 
promote vocational training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the 
placement of local labour. 
The tenth and final sub-index is the fairness and effective legal procedures for dispute 
resolution. It measures the private sector's confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether 
firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute resolution, or as an 
avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official behaviour. 
Control Variables 
We also control for age of firm, the number of employees, survey year, ownership type, and 
economic sector (see table 4.3).  
(Insert table 4.3 here) 
4.4. Results and Discussion 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptively, we compared performance between firms located in the three biggest cities (Ha 
Noi, Ho Chi Minh and Hai Phong) with firms located in other areas. The hypothesis is that 
firms located in the biggest cities having better opportunities to access credit and markets 
resulting in lower transaction costs and better performance. We found that firms located in the 
three biggest cities had higher net incomes than their counterparts in other areas. However, 
these firms had less ROA, ROE, and growth of assets at 1% significant level. 
(Insert table 4.4 here). 
Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in the regression models from 
2007 to 2015.  
Net income is measured by the excess of revenues over expense of a firm that is 
commonly used as a measurement of performance (Dhaliwal et al., 1999). On average, 
the net income of an individual firm was about 137 million VND (USD 6,200; lnnet = 
11.77). The values of other outcome variables in total sample were: ROA (0.30), ROE 
(0.32), gross margin (0.22), growth of revenue (0.44), growth of employees (0.07), and 
growth of assets (0.40). These descriptive results show that firms experienced increasing 
net incomes between 2007 and 2015.  
On average, the highest PCI sub-index is the low entry costs (7.9 points) and the lowest is the 
proactive and creative provincial leadership (4.5 points). It means that the local governments 
have done quite well in order to reduce the costs of entry into markets. This is in line with the 
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 Vietnamese government strategies to encourage start-up programs to improve economic 
performance. However, the proactive and creative provincial leadership is rather low meaning 
that there is a limitation of provincial leadership in solving problems for enterprises.  
 (Insert table 4.5 here) 
4.4.2. Institutional Factors Influencing on SMEs Performance 
We found that the low entry costs negatively influenced ROA, ROE, and gross margin, 
meaning that a decrease in entry cost leads to an increase in number of enterprises. Thus, it is 
expected to increase the level of competitiveness within firms in the same province, therefore 
firms have to reduce product prices. As a result, firm performance can be reduced in the short-
run. However, the existence of additional firms in the market means that firms can find their 
partners (suppliers and customers) more easily and sell more products, enlarge business scales 
and increase revenues. Hence, the low entry costs have a positive effect on growth of revenue 
and growth of assets. This result provides evidence in favour of H1. In addition, the findings 
are similar to the results from study by Klapper et al. (2006).  
Similarly, the proactive and creative provincial leadership has a significantly negative effect 
on net income, ROA and ROE. One way to explain this finding is that the province with 
proactive leaders helps increase the number of established firms by solving problems or 
difficulties that firms are facing in the establishment steps. These actions encourage people 
invest more in doing business, leading to an increase of the number of firms, which increases 
the level of competitiveness. Therefore, the current firms have to reduce price in order to 
compete with their counterparts and their performance in a short-run decrease as well. This 
result provides evidence in favour of H2. Findings also show that the low level of corruption 
in each province (minimal informal charges) has a positive effect on firm performance in a 
short-run (net income, ROA, and ROE). However, it has a weaker effect on firm development 
in the long-run (only negative effect on growth of assets at 5% level of significance). This 
result provides evidence in favour of H5 and H6. This can be explained such that the lower 
corruption level helps firms reduce costs, resulting in improved return on total assets and 
capital invested (an increase in ROA and ROE). In addition, the lower level of corruption 
helps firms save time for building unnecessary relationships, therefore they can invest more in 
selling products, leading to higher net incomes. This finding is in line with previous studies 
(Li and Sun, 2017; Nguyen and van Dijk, 2012). Similarly, the fair and effective legal 
procedures for dispute resolution the fair and effective legal procedures also help firms reduce 
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 costs and time, therefore improving firm performance (positive effect on net income, ROA 
and ROE) as also found by Li and Sun (2017). 
We found that the developed and high-quality business support services and the labour 
training policies positively and significantly influenced firm performance. A better service 
(e.g., notary or tax consulting services) reduce firms’ costs and time, as well as increasing 
quality of products and reducing costs (e.g., better outsourcing services to improve product 
quality; good transportation services help ensure the quality of the goods). Meanwhile, the 
quality of labour source helps firms reduce their costs for re-training new labourers. These 
findings are similar to the results from previous study by Li and Sun (2017). Interestingly, we 
found mixed effects of the ease of access to land, the transparent business environment and 
the limited time requirement on firm performance. This result provides evidence in favour of 
the third and fourth hypotheses.  
Overall, the selected variables explained 20% the variation of net income, about 3% the 
variation of ROA, about 2.5% the variation of ROE, gross margin, growth of employees and 
about 6.9% the variation of growth of revenue indices. To sum up, we stated that increasing 
the quality of provincial public governance leads to the improvement of firm performance due 
to the reduction in costs by cutting unnecessary processes.  
(Insert table 4.6 here) 
4.4.3. Robustness Checks 
One may argue that our regression estimates are biased due to endogenity issues since the 
causality between institutional factors and firm performance runs both ways. Therefore, we 
re-ran the regressions (see in table 4.6) by replacing all institutional variables with lagged 
institutional variables. The results confirm our findings transparent business environment and 
the fair and effective legal procedures have a positive influence on net income, ROA, and 
ROE. It means that a transparent business environment and a fair legal procedure will 
improve firm performance. This finding is particularly important for the implementation of 
administrative reform in developing countries, like Vietnam. 
However, the robustness check does not confirm our findings with respect to the 
relationship between other independent variables and firm performance as well as the 
direction of relationship between selected control variables (total labour force and firm 
age) and firm performance.  
(Insert table 4.7 here) 
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 4.4.4. Testing for Multicollinearity 
We tested for multicollinearity using the VIF test before running all regressions. As shown in 
table 4.8, VIFs range from 1.15 to 7.72 that are below threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). 
Hence the model specifications do not suffer from multicollinearity problem.  
(Insert table 4.8 here) 
4.5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we used a balanced panel data collected over several years from 1,173 firms in 
Vietnam to analyse the effects of institutional factors on SMEs’ performance. SMEs have 
been playing an important role in the development of developed countries as well as in 
developing and transition countries. Through the development of SMEs, institutional factors 
are crucial to help firms access to information, access to markets, as well as to reduce 
transaction costs and time to create new businesses. Formal institutions show the quality of 
activities conducted by the local governments in supporting firms and creating a favourable 
business environment. In Vietnam, the quality of local governments operations in each 
province is different, which is generally caused by the imprecise laws or rules and the 
diversity of social norms.  
We found that the transparent business environment and the fair and effective legal 
procedures have a positive influence on net income, ROA, and ROE confirmed by the 
robustness check. We also contribute to the current literature through a deeper understanding 
of institutional factors’ effects on firm performance (net income, ROA, ROE, gross margin, 
growth of revenue, growth of employees and growth of assets) using a sample from Vietnam. 
By analysing several aspects of local institutions based on 10 sub-indices of the PCI, we 
found that the local institutions have different effects on firm performances, particularly for 
new SMEs and stable ones (firms having a longer time to exist). The lower cost of entry into 
the market helps to create more firms but also has a negative impact on firm performance 
because of the higher competitive level within firms. Moreover, the developed and high-
quality business support services, the labour training policies have a positive effect on firm 
performance. These results are in line with studies by Nguyen et al. (2017) and Nguyen and 
van Dijk (2012). Other controlled variables (e.g., age of firm owners, number of employees, 
type of enterprises and firm sector) also significantly influence firm performance. Overall, 
these findings provide solid support to hypotheses H4 and H10, while there is some support to 
hypotheses H1, H2, H5, H6, H8 and H9. 
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 To improve firm performance, the local governments should focus on training labour force. 
Ideally, the close link between firms and training units helps these organizations provide 
better quality of trained labourers fulfilling firms’ requirements. Therefore, it can reduce the 
gap between theory and practice in training activities. Based on the findings, local 
Vietnamese governments should address the quality of public services. It is also necessary 
to create a forum for firms to participate in the regional political discourse. Based upon this, 
the local governments should adjust their policies in order to help firms overcome their 
difficulties. Besides that, to encourage start-up programs, the local governments should 
create incentives for start-ups to foster the long-term development. The local governments 
should further minimize cost of entry into the market, thus creating an efficient process for 
establishing new firms.  
Despite the interesting findings, some limitations of the study need to be mentioned. First, our 
measure of institutional factors is mainly based upon 10 sub-PCI indices, although the 
institutions have influenced by many other factors. Therefore, other important variables 
should be employed, such as transaction costs and social norms that might influence firm 
performance. Secondly, we only examined how formal institutions influence firm 
performance but did not empirically determine which informal institutional factors affect firm 
performance. This is due to the limitation of the dataset of SMEs survey in Vietnam. 
Future studies should focus on evaluating the impacts of public service delivery by local 
Governments on SMEs’ performance using metrics that capture transparency and corruption 
issues. In the Vietnamese context, the local governments still rely on social norms in each 
province. Therefore, it is important to determine the effects of equity in access to public 
services from local governments on the firm operations and performance. In addition, future 
research could focus on the influence of informal institutions on growth of SMEs as they most 
likely to influence firm governance as well as firm performance. 
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 Table 4.1. Category SMEs Based on Ownership 
Order Firm ownership 
Absolute 
number 
Percent Cum. 
1 Household business 4,208 71.75 71.75 
2 Private enterprise 388 6.62 78.36 
3 Cooperative/Partnership 171 2.92 81.28 
4 Limited liability companies 963 16.42 97.70 
5 Joint stock company 135 2.30 100.00 
  Total 5,865 
  Source: DANIDA survey, authors’ calculation 
 
Table 4.2. Category SMEs Based on Manufacturing Sector 
Order Firm sector 
Absolute 
number 
Percent Cum. 
1 Manufacture of food, beverages, tobacco products 1,815 30.95 30.95 
2 Manufacture of wood, paper products, and printing 1,051 17.92 48.87 
3 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum, 
chemical, rubber, plastics, and other non-metallic 
mineral products 
709 12.09 60.95 
4 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal 
products 
1,075 18.33 79.28 
5 Manufacture of furniture 441 7.52 86.80 
6 Manufacture of other products 774 13.20 100.00 
  Total 5,865     
Source: DANIDA survey, own calculation 
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 Table 4.3. Variables and Measurements 
 Variables Measures 
1 Dependent variables 
 lnnet Natural logarithm of net profit 
 ROA Return / total assets 
 ROE Return / total equity capital 
 gross_margin Gross profit / revenue 
 growth_revenue (Revenuet- revenuet−1) / revenuet−1 
 growth_emp (Employeet- employeet−1) / employeet−1 
 growth_assets (Total assetst- total assetst−1) / total assetst−1 
   
2 Main independent variables 
 PCI_entrycost Low entry costs for business start-up 
 PCI_landaccess Easy access to land and security of business premises 
 PCI_transparency Transparent business environment and equitable business 
information 
 PCI_timecost Has limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and 
inspections 
 PCI_informalcharges Minimal informal charges 
 PCI_statebias Limit crowding out of private activity from policy biases 
toward state, foreign, or connected firms 
 PCI_proactive Proactive and creative provincial leadership in solving 
problems for enterprises 
 PCI_services Developed and high-quality business support services 
 PCI_labourtraining Labour training policies 
 PCI_legalprocedures Fair and effective legal procedures for dispute resolution 
   
3 Control variables 
 firmage Age of firm in years 
 employees Total labour force of enterprise 
 year of survey Year of survey (2007; 2009; 2011; 2013 and 2015) 
 firm ownership Firm ownership (household business; private enterprise; 
cooperative/ partnership; limited liability companies; joint 
stock company; local state enterprise) 
 firm sector Economic sector of firm (see table 4) 
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 Table 4.4. Mean Difference of Firm Performance by Location in Three-biggest Cities 
(T-tests) 
Variables 
Others 
N1 = 2,625 
Firm located in the 
3-biggest cities 
N2 = 3,240 
Differences 
lnnet 11.224 12.216 -0.99*** 
ROA 0.380 0.227 0.15*** 
ROE 0.428 0.237 0.19*** 
gross_margin 0.218 0.213 0.01 
growth_revenue 0.445 0.432 0.01 
growth_emp 0.072 0.073 -0.00 
growth_assets 0.452 0.349 0.10*** 
    
N 5,865   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics from Pooled Sample 
 Variables  Full sample 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
Min Max Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent variables                             
lnnet 6.612 19.515 11.769 1.419 11.285 1.407 11.626 1.419 11.919 1.419 11.995 1.341 12.041 1.365 
ROA -4.761 4.887 0.296 0.470 0.346 0.574 0.335 0.509 0.249 0.387 0.275 0.447 0.272 0.398 
ROE -4.447 4.887 0.323 0.576 0.358 0.629 0.377 0.672 0.270 0.496 0.311 0.593 0.296 0.456 
gross_margin -0.426 3.081 0.215 0.142 0.234 0.192 0.203 0.111 0.225 0.152 0.207 0.101 0.207 0.130 
growth_revenue -1.0 5.0 0.438 1.062   0.698 1.225 0.505 1.113 0.301 0.978 0.258 0.841 
growth_emp -1.0 5.0 0.073 0.634   0.075 0.604 0.059 0.663 0.062 0.625 0.094 0.643 
growth_assets -1.0 4.995 0.396 1.109   0.580 1.294 0.655 1.195 0.191 0.988 0.201 0.850 
                              
Independent variables               
PCI_entrycost 6.301 9.126 7.945 0.726 7.367 0.802 8.346 0.375 8.640 0.299 7.362 0.454 8.010 0.484 
PCI_landaccess 4.123 8.375 5.611 0.871 5.630 0.968 5.355 0.585 5.741 0.938 6.212 0.629 5.116 0.740 
PCI_transparency 4.907 7.150 6.038 0.479 6.302 0.598 6.042 0.365 5.977 0.451 5.673 0.370 6.195 0.294 
PCI_timecost 4.890 7.891 6.087 0.668 6.240 0.504 6.182 0.612 6.146 0.721 5.658 0.707 6.208 0.589 
PCI_informalcharges 4.256 7.899 5.614 0.919 5.909 0.544 5.425 0.670 6.314 0.919 5.648 0.854 4.773 0.763 
PCI_statebias 3.875 7.458 5.260 0.833 6.015 0.588 5.260 0.544 5.260 0.544 5.251 0.982 4.513 0.664 
PCI_proactive 1.391 6.890 4.500 1.039 4.908 1.257 4.139 1.066 4.245 0.989 4.881 0.971 4.326 0.472 
PCI_services 3.046 8.734 6.197 1.322 6.228 1.821 6.654 1.432 5.646 1.390 6.229 0.799 6.227 0.541 
PCI_labourtraining 3.854 7.360 5.688 0.822 5.583 0.627 5.265 0.851 5.192 0.457 5.786 0.563 6.614 0.657 
PCI_legalprocedures 3.313 6.803 5.109 0.854 4.109 0.680 5.345 0.592 5.809 0.345 4.912 0.783 5.372 0.668 
                              
Control variables               
firmage 2 59 16.418 9.918 13.905 10.145 16.184 11.744 14.895 9.000 17.823 9.231 19.286 8.139 
employees 1 300 15.362 29.834 16.849 32.392 16.765 30.290 15.412 30.139 13.924 26.928 13.859 29.062 
                              
 N 5,865 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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 Table 4.6. Effects of PCI sub-indices on Firm Performance 
VARIABLES FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE 5 FE 6 RE 7 lnnet ROA ROE gross_margin growth_revenue growth_emp growth_assets 
        
PCI_entrycost -0.00305 -0.06119*** -0.05348*** -0.00818* 0.40050*** 0.06321 0.24209*** 
 (0.03402) (0.01525) (0.02001) (0.00485) (0.08294) (0.04848) (0.06614) 
PCI_landaccess -0.06548** -0.06496*** -0.09342*** 0.00995** -0.17065*** -0.04100 0.19236*** 
 (0.02897) (0.01649) (0.01985) (0.00454) (0.05607) (0.03691) (0.05001) 
PCI_transparency 0.20202*** 0.09561*** 0.07915*** -0.00534 0.13254* -0.04625 -0.36974*** 
 (0.04167) (0.01984) (0.02703) (0.00595) (0.06918) (0.04288) (0.06011) 
PCI_timecost 0.03096 -0.00175 0.00907 -0.01301*** 0.25452*** 0.07531** 0.10513** 
 (0.03199) (0.01711) (0.02312) (0.00486) (0.06157) (0.03656) (0.04924) 
PCI_informalcharges 0.06100* 0.04445*** 0.05975*** 0.00802 0.04959 -0.02915 -0.07828** 
 (0.03537) (0.01470) (0.02065) (0.00599) (0.05680) (0.03202) (0.03570) 
PCI_statebias 0.00242 0.00408 0.00131 -0.00110 -0.09522** 0.04210 -0.07423** 
 (0.02852) (0.01368) (0.01671) (0.00397) (0.04240) (0.02950) (0.03394) 
PCI_proactive -0.06803*** -0.04544*** -0.04489*** 0.00447 0.02765 0.01957 -0.03671 
 (0.01997) (0.01172) (0.01493) (0.00309) (0.04582) (0.02972) (0.03137) 
PCI_services 0.06166*** 0.02044** 0.02141* 0.00917*** -0.06101 -0.00227 0.06022** 
 (0.01837) (0.00999) (0.01254) (0.00289) (0.04125) (0.02492) (0.02403) 
PCI_labourtraining 0.05306 0.05328** 0.06477** -0.00559 -0.11266 -0.04378 0.06601 
 (0.04202) (0.02103) (0.02787) (0.00626) (0.08809) (0.05538) (0.05007) 
PCI_legalprocedures 0.13076*** 0.03717** 0.03661* -0.00533 0.01287 -0.00812 -0.01122 
 (0.03270) (0.01627) (0.02174) (0.00502) (0.06811) (0.04414) (0.05059) 
        
firm age (in years) -0.00082 0.00037 0.00093 -0.00060* 0.00747* 0.00132 -0.00002 
 (0.00194) (0.00102) (0.00120) (0.00031) (0.00401) (0.00176) (0.00171) 
total labour force of enterprise 0.01102*** 0.00138*** 0.00118* 0.00012 0.00692*** 0.00648*** 0.00170** 
 (0.00135) (0.00049) (0.00062) (0.00009) (0.00173) (0.00218) (0.00067) 
        
year of survey yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
firm ownership yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
firm sector yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Constant 8.56125*** -0.18854 -0.32491 0.27213*** -3.13319*** -0.44741 -0.66431 
 (0.47643) (0.25077) (0.34295) (0.06999) (0.87690) (0.54658) (0.66210) 
Observations 5,705 5,842 5,803 5,845 4,484 4,659 4,321 
R-squared 0.20003 0.03055 0.02476 0.02514 0.06846 0.02850  
Hausman test (Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0374 0.0000 0.0491 0.4529 
Number of firm_ID 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All fixed effect models were confirmed by the Hausman Test 
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 Table 4.7. Robustness Checks with Effects of Lagged PCI sub-indices on Firm Performance 
VARIABLES FE 8 FE 9 FE 10 FE 11 FE 12 FE 13 FE 14 lnnet ROA ROE gross_margin growth_revenue growth_emp growth_assets 
        
lagged_PCI_entrycost 0.05001 0.02162 -0.01231 -0.00381 -0.00960 -0.00146 -0.24398*** 
 (0.03353) (0.01594) (0.02291) (0.00454) (0.04760) (0.02815) (0.05045) 
lagged_PCI_landaccess -0.02593 -0.01964 -0.01356 0.00642 0.08528* 0.00680 0.00157 
 (0.03164) (0.01410) (0.02013) (0.00455) (0.04359) (0.02842) (0.04684) 
lagged_PCI_transparency 0.09138* 0.08160*** 0.10798*** -0.00612 -0.17470** -0.01958 -0.11186 
 (0.04808) (0.02572) (0.03318) (0.00655) (0.07634) (0.04093) (0.07477) 
lagged_PCI_timecost 0.14365*** 0.04716*** 0.06103*** 0.01771*** 0.03908 -0.02829 -0.09634* 
 (0.03678) (0.01620) (0.02128) (0.00505) (0.05103) (0.02933) (0.05306) 
lagged_PCI_informalcharges -0.01118 -0.03753** -0.05954** -0.01849*** -0.06418 -0.02381 0.07584 
 (0.03794) (0.01836) (0.02726) (0.00514) (0.05298) (0.03446) (0.05960) 
lagged_PCI_proactive -0.00003 -0.00334 -0.00768 -0.00088 0.07740*** -0.02067 0.07457*** 
 (0.01981) (0.00970) (0.01288) (0.00284) (0.02688) (0.01652) (0.02836) 
lagged_PCI_services 0.03184 -0.00953 0.00267 0.00957*** 0.01529 0.01113 0.00875 
 (0.02117) (0.00999) (0.01376) (0.00272) (0.02866) (0.01860) (0.03080) 
lagged_PCI_labourtraining 0.00281 -0.00928 -0.03494 -0.00026 -0.08335 -0.06948 -0.21740*** 
 (0.04261) (0.02293) (0.03391) (0.00678) (0.06913) (0.04542) (0.07224) 
lagged_PCI_legalprocedures 0.06422* 0.04859*** 0.07576*** 0.01826*** -0.17450*** -0.03600 -0.08290 
 (0.03415) (0.01759) (0.02457) (0.00478) (0.05287) (0.03198) (0.05296) 
        
firm age (in years) -0.00143 -0.00112 -0.00204 -0.00090*** 0.00662 0.00145 -0.00035 
 (0.00212) (0.00117) (0.00134) (0.00034) (0.00412) (0.00179) (0.00385) 
total labour force of enterprise 0.01105*** 0.00166** 0.00117 0.00003 0.00667*** 0.00644*** 0.00304** 
 (0.00157) (0.00070) (0.00086) (0.00010) (0.00170) (0.00220) (0.00147) 
        
year of survey yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
firm ownership yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
firm sector yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Constant 9.38639*** -0.41606 -0.43156 0.11011 2.15399** 0.87832* 4.37949*** 
 (0.56960) (0.28319) (0.37279) (0.08259) (0.87587) (0.52528) (0.91616) 
Observations 4,547 4,672 4,648 4,672 4,484 4,659 4,321 
R-squared 0.11700 0.02536 0.02123 0.03373 0.06129 0.02650 0.05902 
Hausman test (Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0413 0.0439 
Number of firm_ID 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All fixed effect models were confirmed by the Hausman Test 
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 Table 4.8. Collinearity Tests 
Variables         VIF 1/VIF 
PCI_entrycost 6.760 0.148 
PCI_landaccess 7.170 0.139 
PCI_transparency 2.350 0.425 
PCI_timecost 4.200 0.238 
PCI_informalcharges 4.870 0.205 
PCI_statebias 2.950 0.339 
PCI_proactive 3.360 0.298 
PCI_services 2.800 0.357 
PCI_labourtraining 7.720 0.130 
PCI_legalprocedures 5.050 0.198 
   
firmage 1.150 0.870 
employees 1.410 0.708 
   
year of survey yes yes 
firm ownership yes yes 
firm sector yes yes 
   
Notes: Controlled for year of survey, firm ownership and firm sector; VIF, Variance inflation; 
1/VIF, Tolerance. 
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